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1 
CRIMINAL LAW 
THE CORPORATE INSANITY DEFENSE 
MIHAILIS E. DIAMANTIS0F* 
 
Corporate criminal justice rests on the fiction that corporations possess 
“minds” capable of instantiating culpable mens rea. The retributive and 
deterrent justifications for punishing criminal corporations are strongest 
when those minds are well-ordered. In such cases misdeeds are most likely 
to reflect malice, and sanctions are most likely to have their intended 
preventive benefits. But what if a corporate defendant’s mind is disordered? 
Organizational psychology and economics have tools to identify normally 
functioning organizations that are fully accountable for the harms they 
cause. These disciplines can also diagnose dysfunctional organizations 
where the threads of accountability may have frayed and where sanctions 
would not deter. Punishing such corporations undermines the goals of 
criminal law, leaves victim interests unaddressed, and is unfair to corporate 
stakeholders. 
This Article argues that some corporate criminal defendants should be 
able to raise the insanity defense. Statutory text makes the insanity defense 
available to all qualifying defendants. When a corporate criminal 
defendant’s mind is sufficiently disordered, basic criminal law purposes also 
support the defense. Corporate crime in these cases may trace to 
dysfunctional systems or subversive third parties rather than to corporate 
malice. For example, individual corporate employees may thwart well-
meaning corporate policies to pursue personal advantage at the expense of 
the corporation itself. Corporations then may seem more like victims of their 
own misconduct rather than perpetrators of it. 
 
 * Associate Professor, University of Iowa, College of Law. For invaluable feedback, I 
owe thanks to Richard Redding, Matiangai Sirleaf, William Thomas and participants at the 
Chapman Junior Faculty Works-in-Progress Conference and the Iowa Law Faculty Workshop 
Series. I am also grateful for the help of my research assistants, Katie Alfus, Jessica Bowes, 
and Anthony Fitzpatrick. 
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Justice and prevention favor treatment of insane corporations rather 
than punishment. Recognizing the corporate insanity defense would better 
serve victims’ and stakeholders’ interests in condemning and preventing 
corporate misconduct. Treatment would create an opportunity for 
government experts to reform dysfunctional corporations in a way that 
predominant modes of corporate punishment cannot. Effective reform takes 
victims seriously by minimizing the chance that others will be harmed. It also 
spares corporate stakeholders unnecessary punishment for corporate 
misconduct that could be sanctioned in more constructive ways. 
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“[E]liminating the insanity defense would remove . . . 
the vitally important distinction between illness and evil.” 1F1 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a class of offenders, numbering in the millions, 2F2 that leading 
psychologists believe are constitutively psychotic. 3F3 Their behavior routinely 
defies common sense and ranges from bizarre to patently self-destructive.4F4 
Even though this behavior frequently exposes these offenders to crippling 
criminal liability,5F5 not a single one has raised, let alone benefitted from, an 
insanity plea.6F6 By failing to recognize the role that illness can play in bringing 
about their crimes, the law unjustly punishes defendants who do not deserve 
it. More importantly, the law undermines victims’ interests. By refusing to 
properly treat these defendants’ underlying disorder, the law leaves in place 
an unpredictable disposition to reoffend that risks creating future victims and 
diminishes the significance of past victims’ suffering. 
The “people” who comprise this group of offenders are for-profit 
corporations. The public’s indignation at rampant corporate misconduct is 
palpable and justified.7F7 Pharmaceutical companies poison our citizens, 8F8 car 
 
 1 ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 223 (1967). 
 2 The U.S. Census Bureau puts the figure at nearly seven million. 2015-2016 SUSB 
Employment Change Data Tables, U.S. & States, Totals, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/susb/2016-susb-employment.html 
[https://perma.cc/6YYY-VW6C] (last visited Sept. 3, 2019)  
 3 See infra Part IV.A. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Peter R. Reilly, Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied: We Must End Our Failed 
Experiment in Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 2015 BYU L. REV. 307, 320–22 
(2015) (“If a corporation decides to go to trial and loses, it might face debarment or 
exclusion . . . . For companies that depend heavily on contracts with the federal government, 
exclusion and debarment can amount to a corporate death penalty.”) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted); Larry Thompson, The Blameless Corporation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1323, 1325–26 (2009) (“The other dimension of the conundrum of corporate criminal 
liability, which is the collateral consequences if you are convicted, is enormous.”). 
 6 At least, I have found no examples. 
 7 See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 
2077–80 (2016) (describing the psychological mechanisms behind blaming corporations). 
 8 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Obtains $1.4 Billion 
from Reckitt Benckiser Group in Largest Recovery in a Case Concerning an Opioid Drug in 
United States History (July 11, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
obtains-14-billion-reckitt-benckiser-group-largest-recovery-case [https://perma.cc/6T7G-
C9WX] (“We are confronting the deadliest drug crisis in our nation’s history.”) (quoting 
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the Department of Justice Jody Hunt). 
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companies blacken our skies,9F9 and multinational conglomerates corrupt our 
democracies.10F10 We can only hope that government functionaries feel the 
same indignation when they respond.11F11 
However, we should hesitate before reflexively calling on criminal law 
to punish every corporate harm. As I argue below, traditional modes of 
corporate punishment often do little to address victims’ needs and nothing to 
address their deepest concerns.12F12 Furthermore, behind any large corporation 
are thousands or millions of innocent stakeholders—employees, 
shareholders, creditors, and consumers 13F13—whose wellbeing is also on the 
line.14F14 Although justice favors punishing culpable corporations, it also favors 
sparing these stakeholders the burdens of sanction when neither they nor their 
corporations are culpable. Criminal liability should not be a one-way ratchet. 
Some crime should be punished; other crime should be managed. Doctrines 
 
 9 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty and 
Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six Volkswagen Executives and Employees 
are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-
criminal-and-civil-penalties-six [https://perma.cc/Q5FZ-GSJQ] (“If the software detected that 
the vehicle was not being tested, it operated in a different mode, in which the vehicle’s 
emissions control systems were reduced substantially, causing the vehicle to emit NOx up to 
40 times higher than U.S. standards.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead 
Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in 
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html 
[https://perma.cc/GMV5-VYHQ] (“Siemens AG engaged in systematic efforts to falsify its 
corporate books and records . . . [in order to hide nearly a billion dollars for making] corrupt 
payments to foreign officials through the payment mechanisms, which included cash desks 
and slush funds.”). 
 11 See generally William S. Laufer, Where Is the Moral Indignation Over Corporate 
Crime?, in REGULATING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 19 (Dominik Brodowski, Manuel 
Espinoza de los Monteros de la Parra, Klaus Tiedemann & Joachim Vogel eds., 2014) (arguing 
that prosecutors should show more genuine indignation at corporate misconduct). 
 12 See infra Part VI. 
 13 Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 825 (2003) (“Stakeholders are people whose financial well-being is tied 
to the corporation’s success, such as employees, suppliers, charities, and communities.”). 
 14 See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2009) (“This punishment is inflicted instead on human 
beings whose guilt remains unproven. Innocent shareholders pay the fines, and innocent 
employees, creditors, customers, and communities sometimes feel the pinch too.”). 
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that establish guilt must be tempered by doctrines that excuse and treat the 
blameless and unblameable.15F15 
Some will mistakenly think this Article is an exercise in corporate 
apology. It is worth pausing now, at the start, to insist adamantly to the 
contrary. This will be clear by the Article’s end, after I have discussed the 
consequences of a successful corporate insanity plea. The motivating impulse 
of this Article is to meet the needs of individuals affected by corporate crime, 
both victims and innocent corporate stakeholders. While these interests 
should be the guiding light of corporate criminal law, that law presently 
disserves them all. Ordinarily, sensitivity to victim and stakeholder interests 
might require a zero-sum tradeoff of one against the other. 16F16 The corporate 
insanity defense provides a rare opportunity to advance both simultaneously, 
without requiring any legislative intervention. 
Now is a good time to reconsider the scope and demands of the insanity 
defense. In March 2020, the Supreme Court decided Kahler v. Kansas and 
held that the Constitution17F17 does not require states to offer the defense. 18F18 
Kahler is a middle-aged white male. Commentators should pause to 
considered what implications the arguments in his case might have for 
defendants who are different from him. For example, some jurisdictions 
categorically exclude juveniles from raising the insanity defense, despite the 
fact that mental health is as much a concern among the young as it is among 
adults.19F19 Similarly, all jurisdictions tacitly exclude corporations from the 
insanity defense. These exclusions are likely mistakes. I address the 
 
 15 HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 414–15 (1979) (“Condemning one 
who is blameless is universally abhorred as an injustice, and it is astonishing that those who 
advocate criminal liability regardless of culpability do not perceive this abhorrence as an 
insurmountable obstacle to the adoption of their program.”); Paul H. Robinson, A System of 
Excuses: How Criminal Law’s Excuse Defenses Do, and Don’t, Work Together to Exculpate 
Blameless (and Only Blameless) Offenders, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 259, 261 (2009) 
[hereinafter Robinson, A System of Excuses]; Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A 
Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 229 (1982) (“Excuses do not destroy blame, as 
do the three groups of defenses previously discussed; rather, they shift if [sic] from the actor 
to the excusing conditions.”) [hereinafter Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses]. 
 16 For example, ordering a corporate criminal to pay restitution or a fine may satisfy victim 
interests, but at the expense of corporate stakeholders who effectively pay the fine. GLANVILLE 
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 863 (2d ed. 1961) (“[A] fine imposed on 
the corporation is in reality aimed against shareholders who are not . . . responsible for the 
crime, i.e., is aimed at innocent persons.”). 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”). 
 18 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1027 (2020). 
 19 Emily S. Pollock, Note, Those Crazy Kids: Providing the Insanity Defense in Juvenile 
Courts, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2041, 2041 (2001) (“[T]he affirmative insanity defense is, in many 
jurisdictions, available to people over the age of eighteen but not to juveniles.”). 
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corporate exclusion below and argue that corporations, like individuals, can 
behave in ways that call reason and accountability into doubt. 
The clearest, though by no means only, examples of such behavior 
involve plainly self-destructive corporate conduct. Often thought to be 
paragons of rational calculation,20F20 corporations sometimes deviate in bizarre 
ways, far from the path of maximum utility. Consider the textbook classic, 
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California.21F21 In the 1990s, 
prosecutors accused Sun-Diamond of illegally funneling tens of thousands of 
dollars to a political campaign.22F22 Legally speaking, Sun-Diamond committed 
bribery.23F23 Colloquially speaking, it was, in the words of the D.C. Circuit, 
“befuddled.”24F24 Sun-Diamond had only the remotest of hypothetical interests 
in the politician’s fortunes. The only sure result was that the payments 
exposed the corporation to significant legal risks. As the court remarked, 
Sun-Diamond looked more like a victim of its own misconduct.25F25 While 
bound by current law to uphold the conviction, the court chastised the 
prosecutor for bringing the case in the first place. 26F26 
Sun-Diamond represents a broader class of cases where self-
undermining corporate behavior conflicts with the rational behavior that 
responsible action presupposes.27F27 In many instances of illegal conduct—
 
 20 See Harvey M. Silets & Susan W. Brenner, The Demise of Rehabilitation: Sentencing 
Reform and the Sanctioning of Organizational Criminality, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 367 (1986) 
(“The corporation is a rational actor striving to maximize financial gain and minimize financial 
loss, and so can be manipulated most easily by imposing monetary penalties that affect these 
acts.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 21 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
 22 Id. at 969–70. 
 23 See id. at 977 (upholding corporate bribery conviction). 
 24 Id. at 970. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. (“Where there is adequate evidence for imputation (as here), the only thing that 
keeps deceived corporations from being indicted for the acts of their employee-deceivers is 
not some fixed rule of law or logic but simply the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”). 
 27 See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 777, 783 (1985) (“Rationality is notoriously hard to define, but a reasonable 
working definition would include reference to both the sensibleness of the actor’s goals and 
the logic of the means chosen to achieve them . . . . In a rough and ready fashion, we may ask 
whether, given the social context, any sense can be made of the actor’s goals, whether any 
reasonable person could hold them, whether they are logically or empirically intelligible.”). 
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from insider trading28F28 to embezzlement29F29—the criminal corporations are 
often their own and only victims. Corporations can face criminal charges for 
exposing their own secrets30F30 and stealing from their own coffers.31F31 
Such bizarre corporate behavior only starts to make sense once we peel 
back the fiction that defines corporations as unified legal subjects, and peek 
inside at the real people, incentives, and systems that comprise them. 
Realistically speaking, Sun-Diamond did not, in its corporate capacity, bribe 
an irrelevant politician; an employee funneled Sun-Diamond’s money to a 
personal friend.32F32 Corporations do not share their own proprietary 
information; employees commit insider trading using corporate secrets for 
personal gain.33F33 Corporations do not steal from themselves; employees 
embezzle corporate funds for personal use. 34F34 
Nonsensical corporate behavior is an inevitable byproduct of the 
particular way that the law construes corporate “personhood.” 35F35 The law’s 
simplistic conception of corporate psychology is unmoored from any 
organizational science or economic sense. According to respondeat superior, 
the centuries-old doctrine most jurisdictions use to hold an employer liable 
for the actions of its employees, 36F36 corporations basically do and think 
whatever their employees do and think. 37F37 This means that even when 
 
 28 John P. Anderson, When Does Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading Make 
Sense?, 46 STETSON L. REV. 147, 156 (2016) (“It turns out that in most (though not all) cases 
where a corporation is subject to criminal liability for the insider trading of its employees, it 
(or its shareholders) is by theory of law also the principal victim of that same trading.”). 
 29 See City of New York v. Fox, 133 N.E. 434, 435 (1921) (“[T]he warden was just as 
much responsible for the misappropriation by his appointee as he would have been if he had 
committed the fault himself.”). 
 30 See JOHN P. ANDERSON, INSIDER TRADING: LAW, ETHICS, AND REFORM 113–14 (2018) 
(“[In true insider trading cases], shareholders are forced to suffer the crime and the 
punishment!”). 
 31 See, e.g., In re Chinacast Educ. Corp. Sec. Litig., 809 F.3d 471, 472–73 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(attributing to corporation the fraudulent intent of CEO and CFO who embezzled millions of 
corporate funds). 
 32 United States v. Sun-Diamond, 138 F.3d 961, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 
(1999). 
 33 SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 863–64 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that former 
employee of software company used access to corporate secrets to commit insider trading). 
 34 Nat’l Football Scouting Inc. v. Cont’l Assur. Co., 931 F.2d 646, 649–50 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(reversing summary judgment that had favored a corporation that employed an embezzling 
employee). 
 35 See infra Part VI.B. 
 36 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 496 (1909) 
(recognizing, for the first time, the possibility of corporate criminal liability under federal law 
for affirmative acts). 
 37 See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1841, Westlaw (database updated May 2019). 
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employees do or think things that make no sense from the corporate 
perspective, the law says corporate employers do and think those things as 
well. It makes no legal difference how hard corporations try to keep their 
employees on track through corrective policies and compliance procedures. 38F38 
Ordinarily in criminal law, patently nonsensical behavior strongly 
suggests that an individual criminal defendant has a condition that mitigates 
his responsibility.39F39 The law recognizes that bringing the full destructive 
force of criminal sanctions to bear would be inappropriate in these 
circumstances.40F40 A different official response (like mental health treatment) 
better meets the interests of justice. 
I argue below that similar logic applies to some cases of corporate 
misbehavior. Corporate misconduct often occurs in an evil organization that 
deserves a harsh criminal justice response. But when corporate misconduct 
disserves the corporation’s own interests, it may instead reflect a broken or 
exploited organization, rather than an evil one. It is hard to see what 
retributive or deterrent value there could be to punishment in those cases. If 
a corporation is broken, it may lack the rational mechanisms needed to weigh 
the deterrent costs of sanctions. If it is internally exploited, it already has 
reason enough to prevent further misconduct. Either way, there seems to be 
no tangible sense in which such corporations display the evil intent that is the 
lynchpin of retributive justice. Punishing them neither fixes their dysfunction 
nor sanctions the insiders who exploit them—it only serves to burden 
innocent corporate stakeholders who may have already suffered because of 
the underlying misconduct.41F41 
 
 38 See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(“[Corporate liability for employee misconduct] may attach without proof that the conduct 
was within the agent’s actual authority, and even though it may have been contrary to express 
instructions.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.800, https://www.justice.gov/ 
usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations 
[https://perma.cc/X733-HZ7C] (“[T]he existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, 
in and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct undertaken by 
its officers, directors, employees, or agents.”). 
 39 Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity 
and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1117 (2007) 
(“Rationality is the [philosophical] touchstone of responsibility, as the structure of criminal 
law itself indicates.”). 
 40 Hotema v. United States, 186 U.S. 413, 416 (1902) (approving the following language 
in a jury instruction: “Where reason ceases to have dominion over the mind proven to be 
diseased, the person reaches a degree of insanity where criminal responsibility ceases and 
accountability to the law for the purpose of punishment no longer exists.”). 
 41 See Alschuler, supra note 14, at 1367–68 (noting that innocent shareholders, 
employees, and other stakeholders of a corporation are the ones who primarily suffer the 
consequences of corporate criminal sanctions). 
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Although the doctrinal focus of the corporate insanity defense must be 
on corporate defendants, any broader policy justification must focus on 
individuals.42F42 Individual corporate stakeholders are surely one relevant 
constituency, but victims should come first. The corporate insanity defense 
would have no legitimate role in corporate criminal law if it undermined 
victim interests. These interests include paying restitution, preventing future 
corporate harms (whether to past or to future victims), and giving victims 
their day in court to tell their stories and demand recognition. Corporate 
criminal law must do better for victims. It (sometimes) delivers on restitution, 
but unequivocally fails with respect to prevention and expressive values.43F43 
A corporate insanity defense would both prevent more corporate crime 
and lead to more trials when corporations do commit crime, all without 
compromising victim restitution. Introducing the possibility of finding 
corporate defendants “not guilty only by reason of insanity” would lower the 
barriers prosecutors face when initiating corporate trials and would thereby 
provide a surer legal mechanism for recognizing corporate wrongs. The 
consequences to corporate defendants of such a verdict—which would 
include intensive compliance reform, the corporate equivalent of mental 
health treatment—would better prevent offenses from recurring than the 
penalties criminal corporations currently face. 
There are two strategies the law could take to address its failure to 
provide justice to victims and corporate stakeholders. The first and more 
familiar approach is to call for radical legal change. Commentators in this 
camp have suggested rewriting the law’s most basic doctrines for 
understanding corporate conduct, thought, and liability.44F44 Many of these 
dramatic proposals would change things for the better, but they have little 
realistic prospect of being adopted in the near future. Most would require 
coordination among legislators, administrators, and judges. In the present 
 
 42 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 95 (2014) (arguing that corporations only have standing to assert certain 
constitutional rights on behalf of the corporations’ individual members). See also Margaret 
M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1679 (2015) (“If the Court is going to recognize a corporate right, 
it should be able to identify the specific group of natural persons from whom the corporate 
right is derived.”). 
 43 See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate 
Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 565–68 (2018). 
 44 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099–101 (1991) (proposing corporate ethos, 
rather than respondeat superior, as a measure of liability). 
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political climate, even modest cooperation seems too much to hope for. 45F45 
There is a long-lived status quo bias in corporate criminal law. Despite 
decades of near-universal opposition to current doctrine,46F46 the law has seen 
little reform, and none is predicted. 
Here, I adopt a different approach that aims to work within the law as it 
presently stands, while also pointing out threads that have been overlooked, 
unappreciated, and underexplored. The single strand I investigate here is the 
law of excuses47F47 and, in particular, the excuse provided to insane 
defendants.48F48 All but five U.S. jurisdictions absolve criminals who suffer 
from serious mental disease or defect. 49F49 The prima facie legal case for a 
corporate insanity defense in these jurisdictions is simple to state. Under 
federal law, the insanity defense is available to any criminal “defendant,” 50F50 
without regard to corporeal or corporate form. Under state law, the defense 
is typically available to any “person,” 51F51 defined to include “any natural 
person [or] . . . corporation.”52F52 The deeper legal case draws on corporate 
psychology, economics, and organizational science to show how 
corporations can satisfy the legal definition of insanity and how recognizing 
this would promote fundamental criminal justice policies. 
In support of the individual insanity defense, leading commentator 
Stephen J. Morse observed: “We should not abolish the insanity defense 
unless we truly believe that every perpetrator of a criminal act deserves to be 
punished, no matter how [mentally ill]. If we do not believe this . . . then we 
must retain the defense.”53F53 As I argue below, the corporate insanity defense 
satisfies Morse’s bar: There are some corporations who do not deserve to be 
punished because their crimes show they are, organizationally speaking, too 
 
 45 Charles Gardner Geyh, Courts, Congress, and the Constitutional Politics of Interbranch 
Restraint, 87 GEO. L.J. 243, 246 (1998) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS, 
CONGRESS, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF INTERBRANCH RESTRAINT (1997)) (noting 
increased interbranch conflicts between judges and legislators in a highly partisan era). 
 46 Ved P. Nanda, Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is A New Approach 
Warranted?, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 605 (2010), reprinted in CORPORATE LIABILITY: 
EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK 63, 85–87 (Mark Pieth & Radha Ivory eds., 2011). 
 47 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CATHERINE PALO, AVIK K. GANGULY, MYRON MOSKOVITZ & JANE 
GRALL, 2 CRIM. L. DEF. Excuses—generally § 161, Westlaw (database updated July 2020). 
 48 Id. Insanity § 173. 
 49 Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal 
Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 85 (2006). 
 50 18 U.S.C. § 17. 
 51 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. L. INST. 2019). 
 52 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(8) (AM. L. INST. 2019). State law uses “human being” when 
it means to refer to members of the species homo sapiens. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 210.0(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019). 
 53 Morse, supra note 27, at 836. 
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“ill.” Skeptical readers’ thoughts will naturally jump to extreme cases of 
seemingly psychopathic corporations escaping conviction for heinous 
crimes. I will address such cases head-on below.54F54 For now, I note that 
fixating on sensational crimes has corrupted perceptions of the individual 
insanity defense for decades, and I hope to avoid the same here. 55F55 Rest 
assured: psychopathic corporations would not qualify for the defense. 
To meet Morse’s threshold, I need not wade into the thick of the 
constitutional debate addressed by the Court in Kahler. While I will engage 
the criminal justice fundamentals on which the case partially turned, I will 
not suggest that corporations have a constitutional right to raise the insanity 
defense. Unlike punishing insane individuals,56F56 punishing disordered 
corporations is neither “cruel” (they have no feelings) 57F57 nor “unusual” (we 
have done it for more than a century).58F58 There is no history or tradition that 
would justify a fundamental due process right to the corporate insanity 
defense.59F59 
After some preliminary clarifications (Part I), I begin by laying out the 
history behind the insanity defense and its various present-day formulations 
(Part II). I describe two corporate disorders that satisfy the legal definitions 
of insanity (Part III). As I also show, recognizing the corporate insanity 
defense for corporations with these disorders would advance basic criminal 
justice goals like retribution and deterrence. I then contextualize these 
disorders by describing several features of corporations—as conceived by the 
law, economists, and organizational psychologists—that are common 
sources of bizarre or destructive behavior (Part IV). 
In the second half the Article, I turn to more pragmatic considerations 
and describe what the defense might look like in practice (Part V). Most 
importantly, a successful corporate insanity defense comes with strings 
 
 54 See infra Section III.A. 
 55 David B. Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 528, 531 
(1985) (“[I]t is my belief that public disrespect for the defense erupts principally from insanity 
acquittals in certain species of homicide cases.”). 
 56 Kahler argued in part that executing the insane violates the Eighth Amendment. See 
Brief for Petitioner at 29, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135); see also 
Stephen M. LeBlanc, Cruelty to the Mentally Ill: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to the 
Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 (2007) (arguing that 
abolishing the insanity defense would violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 57 Dynamic Image Techs. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34, 37 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(“[C]orporations, unlike natural persons, have no emotions . . . .”). 
 58 See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 
(1909) (upholding criminal conviction of corporation). 
 59 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 49 (1996) (noting that state policy violates due 
process if it conflicts with fundamental rules established in the historical traditions of the 
country). 
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attached. Like other insanity acquittees, insane corporations would undergo 
intensive treatment and rehabilitation, during which various incapacitating 
protocols would protect the public from reinjury. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that jurisdictions have wide latitude to shape their insanity 
doctrines and procedures.60F60 Procedural adjustments—like shifting burdens 
of proof and persuasion—could mitigate potential concerns about abuse and 
overuse. Though scholars discussing the insanity defense typically focus on 
defendants, an effective corporate insanity defense could be a major step 
toward finally making corporate criminal law serve victim interests as well 
(Part VI). The only remaining question is whether the defense would be 
appealing enough for corporations to pursue. I conclude that, despite its costs 
to corporate defendants, the insanity defense offers sufficiently attractive 
advantages over presently available alternatives (Conclusion). 
One more note of context before digging in: I have previously argued in 
favor of punishing all corporations primarily by coercively reforming 
them.61F61 The basic idea is that corporate criminal fines are retributively 
inappropriate (because they hit innocent shareholders) and ineffective at 
deterring corporate misconduct (because they do not hit corporate decision 
makers). Court-ordered reform could do better on both fronts. Here, I offer a 
separate legal and policy-based argument for forcibly reforming a narrower 
class of corporate criminals where reform is especially needed—those that 
are legally insane. 
I. SUSPENDING SKEPTICISM (AT LEAST UNTIL PART V) 
I expect that many readers will greet the prospect of a corporate insanity 
defense with some initial skepticism. The argument for it draws on concepts 
from corporate criminal law, organizational psychology, systems theory, and 
economics. To clear the path for what follows, I respond here to some 
preliminary hurdles that might otherwise threaten to derail the conversation 
before it starts. I aim to persuade readers to suspend their skepticism until I 
have had a chance to explain in concrete terms what corporate insanity is and 
to describe the tangible benefits of treating it rather than punishing it. 
My thesis—that the criminal law should recognize a corporate insanity 
defense—must be distinguished from three further theses that I do not 
endorse and that do not follow as a matter of law or logic from what I do 
endorse. First, the corporate insanity defense does not imply that all or even 
most corporations should escape liability for their crimes. I have argued 
 
 60 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006). 
 61 See generally Diamantis, supra note 43 (arguing that coercive reform is the only just 
and effective punishment for corporate criminals). 
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extensively against this abolitionist position because I believe there are 
values to punishing corporate misconduct that other systems of corporate 
liability cannot replicate.62F62 Properly understood, the corporate insanity 
defense would apply only to “disease[d] or defect[ive]” corporations.63F63 The 
conditions that qualify a corporation for the defense must be relatively 
infrequent, even among corporate criminals. One commentator has quipped 
that “[i]ncorporation is the law’s most successful diminished capacity 
defense.”64F64 I hope to prove him right, but not in the way he intended. 
Second, this Article’s focus on corporate liability does not imply that 
responsible individuals within corporations should escape prosecution. The 
public is rightly angered when executives evade accountability for their 
organization’s crimes, seemingly as a matter of course. 65F65 The reasons this 
happens are complex,66F66 but we must strive to overcome them. Prosecutors 
can and should investigate charges against both corporations and implicated 
individual employees for any business crime. 67F67 Indeed, this is already the 
Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) stated goal. 68F68 Holding culpable employees 
accountable is an essential component of any comprehensive strategy for 
addressing corporate crime.69F69 
Lastly, in arguing that the criminal law should excuse some corporate 
conduct, I do not mean to minimize the significant harms that corporate 
 
 62 See, e.g., Diamantis, supra note 7, at 2058–67. 
 63 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 64 MARTIN BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW § 8:1 (5th ed. 
2019), Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2019). 
 65 See Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail, NEW YORKER (July 24, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/31/why-corrupt-bankers-avoid-jail 
[https://perma.cc/PZ8M-J6F2]. 
 66 See generally SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE (2016) (discussing factors that lead to leniency 
in prosecuting corporate crime). 
 67 It should be born in mind that sometimes when corporations misbehave there will be no 
culpable employees. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate 
Crime: An Economic Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL 
LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 11, 16 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow 
eds., 2011); see also United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 847–48 (1st Cir. 
1987) (convicting corporation despite prior acquittal of all involved employees). 
 68 Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download (requiring line prosecutors to 
gather all information about culpable individuals before settling charges against corporations) 
[https://perma.cc/WFA9-28JL]. 
 69 See, e.g., Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 17–18, 28–
29 (2019) (“[D]eterring corporate crime requires deterring individual employees from 
committing crime on the corporation’s behalf.”). 
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crime, excused or not, inflicts on its victims. “Excuse defenses . . . do not 
turn unacceptable behavior into permissible conduct.”70F70 To the contrary, as I 
argue below, the corporate insanity defense is more victim-affirming than 
current approaches to sanctioning dysfunctional corporate misconduct. I 
have previously called on lawmakers and scholars to pay more attention to 
victims when designing corporate enforcement priorities. 71F71 Federal criminal 
law and sentencing guidelines rightly give primacy of place to making 
victims whole.72F72 I mean nothing I say here to diminish the law’s 
responsibility for ensuring that corporations compensate their victims, even 
for misconduct that the criminal law may ultimately excuse. As courts have 
emphasized, victim restitution serves essentially civil rather than criminal 
functions.73F73 An intricate civil liability regime runs parallel to most of 
corporate criminal law.74F74 There is no general insanity defense to civil 
liability, nor should there be.75F75 
Even with this clarification, three foundational objections to the 
corporate insanity defense must be set aside as beyond the scope of my 
argument. In the remainder of this Part, I hope to show that, whatever their 
philosophical merits, these objections have unacceptable legal, policy, and 
strategic implications. 
 
 70 ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173(a). 
 71 Mihailis E. Diamantis & William S. Laufer, Prosecution and Punishment of Corporate 
Criminality, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 453, 454 (2019) (“In the absence of a corporate 
victimology, there is a far greater likelihood that criminal justice priorities, resources, and 
expenditures will be mismeasured.”). 
 72 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (mandating restitution orders in criminal cases); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.1(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (requiring 
courts sentencing corporations to order victim restitution and to prioritize payment of 
restitution over payment of fines). 
 73 See United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Functionally, the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a tort statute . . . .”). 
 74 See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal 
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1327–28 (2001) (“Parallel statutory regimes providing civil 
and criminal sanctions for essentially the same conduct exist in virtually every area of white-
collar wrongdoing, including health care fraud, environmental harms, workplace safety, and 
securities law.”). 
 75 See William E. Westerbeke, Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part II, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 
225, 225 (2002) (referring to “the unanimous American rule that insanity does not prevent the 
existence of an intent for purposes of civil liability”); Victoria O’Brien, Civil Legal Remedies 
for Crime Victims, OVC BULL. (Dec. 1993), https://booksite.elsevier.com/9780323287654/
content/CH5-OVC_Civil_remedies.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX35-GA2Q]. 
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The first objection rejects any notion that excuses can apply to corporate 
misconduct.76F76 Excuses function by negating moral accountability for harm.77F77 
If corporations are necessarily morally unaccountable, excuses do not 
apply.78F78 Philosopher Susan Wolf has compared corporations to sociopaths, 
whom she believes lack moral standing.79F79 If corporations are not responsible 
agents, they can have no responsibility to excuse, whether by the insanity 
defense or otherwise. 
Whether the objection assumes that corporations are not moral agents 
because they cannot truly act, or because they can act but not responsibly, 80F80 
this is a dangerous path to go down. It threatens to unravel all corporate 
criminal law. The Supreme Court recognized more than a century ago that 
the law must hold corporations criminally accountable if it is to have 
effective tools for controlling corporate harm. 81F81 Undoing corporate criminal 
law would leave the public vulnerable to corporate villainy. It would also risk 
 
 76 See Sylvia Rich, Can Corporations Experience Duress? An Examination of Emotion-
Based Excuses and Group Agents, 13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 149, 149–50 (2019) (“It seems unlikely 
that a corporate entity could benefit from such human-specific defenses as insanity or lack of 
capacity.”). Interestingly, Rich argues that corporations could benefit from a duress defense. 
Id. at 150. 
 77 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, supra note 15, at 221 (“Excuses admit that the deed 
may be wrong, but excuse the actor because conditions suggest that the actor is not responsible 
for his deed.”). 
 78 See C.M.V. Clarkson, Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls, 59 MOD. 
L. REV. 557, 566 (1996) (“Culpability can only be attributed to moral agents and many 
commentators have argued that companies, for these purposes, cannot be culpability-bearing 
agents in their own right.”). 
 79 Susan Wolf, The Legal and Moral Responsibility of Organizations, in CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII, 267, 278–81 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985); 
see also Amy J. Sepinwall, Blame, Emotions, and the Corporation, in THE MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 143, 144–63 (Eric W. Orts & N. Craig Smith eds., 2017) (arguing 
since corporations do not have emotions, they cannot be morally responsible). 
 80 See 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615 Insanity Defense § 14, Westlaw (database 
updated Sept. 2020) (“Automatism is a defense closely related to unconsciousness. A person 
in a state of automatism, while capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing. Such a 
person may perform complex actions without intent, exercise of will, or knowledge of the act. 
Automatistic behavior is frequently followed by a partial or complete inability to recall the 
actions performed while unconscious.”); Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the 
Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1572–73 (1980) (arguing that an unconscious person 
cannot be responsible for his acts); People v. Ray, 533 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Cal. 1975) (noting 
that involuntary unconsciousness is a full defense to criminal charges). 
 81 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) (“We see 
no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation [should be 
held criminally accountable] . . . .”); see generally Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function 
of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473 (2006) (arguing that the criminal law has uniquely 
powerful deterrent effects for corporations). 
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undermining the broader legitimacy and efficacy of criminal law. 82F82 The 
concept of corporate responsibility is an ingrained and intuitive fixture of our 
social lives.83F83 Perceptions of corporate agency and responsibility are 
hardwired into our cognitive architecture. 84F84 If the criminal law refuses to 
hold corporations accountable, it risks undermining its perceived moral 
authority. In any case, given the broad public support for punishing 
corporations, abolishing corporate criminal law is a political nonstarter. 85F85 
A second objection to the corporate insanity defense says that 
corporations cannot be insane because they do not have minds. 86F86 This 
objection has even further-reaching abolitionist implications than the first. A 
foundational premise of corporate law is the fiction that corporations have 
mental states.87F87 While “the corporate personality is a [legal] fiction, [it is] a 
fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact.” 88F88 Regardless of 
whether corporations really have minds, there are compelling reasons for the 
pretense.89F89 Without that fiction, corporations could not take the many legal 
actions that make them so useful, like entering into contracts, buying 
property, selling goods, etc. It is hornbook law that without a “meeting of the 
minds” there can be no contract.90F90 Furthermore, abandoning the fiction that 
 
 82 PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 176–88 (2013) 
(“[T]he criminal law’s moral credibility is essential to effective crime control . . . .”). 
 83 Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz, Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies, 7 
PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 67, 71–72 (2008); Matthew J. O’Laughlin & Bertram F. 
Malle, How People Explain Actions Performed by Groups and Individuals, 82 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCH. 33, 33 (2002). 
 84 Diamantis, supra note 7, at 2077–80; Steven J. Sherman & Elise J. Percy, The 
Psychology of Collective Responsibility: When and Why Collective Entities Are Likely To Be 
Held Responsible for the Misdeeds of Individual Members, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 137, 150 (2010); 
Amy L. Johnson & Sarah Queller, The Mental Representations of High and Low Entitativity 
Groups, 21 SOC. COGNITION 101, 112 (2003) (providing evidence of a basic shift in cognition 
toward groups with high versus low entitativity). 
 85 See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 612 (2012) (arguing 
that the public demands corporate criminal liability). But see John Hasnas, The Centenary of 
a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 
1329 (2009) (arguing against corporate criminal liability). 
 86 See John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal 
Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 350 (2004). 
 87 See generally Diamantis, supra note 7 (discussing criminal law’s commitment to 
corporate mental states). 
 88 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 89 See generally CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, 
DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS (2011) (arguing that corporations are agents). 
But see generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE 
SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (arguing that corporations are not 
agents). 
 90 Insurance Company v. Young’s Administrator, 90 U.S. 85, 107 (1874). 
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corporations have minds would effectively immunize corporations from most 
significant forms of liability.91F91 The vast majority of crimes require both a 
criminal act and a criminal mental state.92F92 No mind, no mens rea, no crime. 
Finally, I set aside (at least until Part V) a third class of objections 
because of their close kinship to a destructive and mistaken mythology that 
opponents of the insanity defense have recited for decades.93F93 Unsubstantiated 
criticisms of the insanity defense include that it allows criminals to “beat the 
wrap,”94F94 involves arbitrary line-drawing,95F95 is too vague,96F96 is too widely 
used,97F97 releases dangerous criminals back into the public, 98F98 and is a “rich 
 
 91 See Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Extended Corporate Mind: When Corporations Use AI 
to Break the Law, 98 N.C. L. REV. 893, 899 (2020) (discussing the implications of not having 
a doctrine for attributing mental states to corporations when they act through algorithmic 
rather than employees). 
 92 United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) (“In the criminal law, both a 
culpable mens rea and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur.”). 
 93 See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity 
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 604 (1989) (“I begin the process of 
unpacking the myths by focusing on a series of meta-myths that have developed around the 
empirical myths: myths animated by an omnipresent fear of feigning, by a community sense 
that mental illness is somehow different from other illnesses, by a public need for mentally 
disabled criminal defendants to conform to certain typical external manifestations of 
‘craziness,’ and by a persistent belief that it is simply improper to exculpate most criminal 
defendants because of their mental illness.”). 
 94 Linda C. Fentiman, “Guilty But Mentally Ill”: The Real Verdict Is Guilty, 26 B.C. L. 
REV. 601, 601–02 (1985) (“Although the insanity defense is invoked in far less than one 
percent of all felony cases, and is successful in only a fraction of the cases in which it is 
invoked, the view is widely held that the insanity defense is used to ‘coddle’ criminals and to 
permit guilty and violent individuals to escape the criminal sanction.”). 
 95 Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 864–65 (Ala. 1887) (“It is no satisfactory objection to say 
that the rule above announced by us is of difficult application. The rule in McNaghten’s Case 
is equally obnoxious to a like criticism. The difficulty does not lie in the rule, but is inherent 
in the subject of insanity itself.”) (citation omitted). 
 96 1 NAT’L COMM. ON REFORM OF FED. CRIM. LAWS, WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 249 (1970) (noting the key terms in the 
various insanity tests are so vague that they “invite semantic jousting, metaphysical 
speculation, intuitive moral judgments in the guise of factual determinations”). 
 97 William S. Laufer, The Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 453, 
454 (1995) (reviewing MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
(1994)) (“Myth 1[:] The insanity defense is overused.”). 
 98 Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both 
Succeeded in Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity 
Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 972–75 (1987) (“One of the most palpable bases for public 
distrust of the insanity defense is the widespread fear that defendants found NGRI are quickly 
released from mental hospitals to commit new crimes against society.”). 
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man’s” defense.99F99 I assume, along with most criminal law professors, that 
the insanity defense for individuals is desirable and that we should dismiss 
these myths.100F100 
For individual defendants, the data belie the naysayers’ story. 
Defendants rarely feign mental illness.101F101 Indeed, defendants are more likely 
to feign sanity than insanity.102F102 The insanity defense is pled in only 0.9% of 
cases and is successful in only 0.2%.103F103 Criminal defendants whom courts 
find to be insane are rarely set free. In the vast majority of cases, they face 
commitment to a mental institution, 104F104 often for longer than the prison 
sentence they would have faced upon conviction. 105F105 Lastly, the rich are no 
more likely to benefit from the defense than the poor. 106F106 
These data are, of course, all about individuals asserting the insanity 
defense. There is no such data about corporations. In its absence, we should 
resist unfounded speculation. Allowing this sort of criticism to creep in too 
 
 99 Morse, supra note 27, at 798–99 (“It is also often claimed that insanity is a rich person’s 
defense—the Hinckley verdict is a particularly popular example—but this claim proves too 
much. Wealthier defendants can almost always retain the best attorneys and experts in all types 
of cases, both civil and criminal.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(d) 
(3d ed. 2019), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2019) (“Insanity is in practice only a ‘rich 
man’s defense’ in that only the wealthy can afford the array of experts needed to mount a 
convincing defense—experts who are in short supply and whose time would be better spent 
in treatment of those who have been committed or imprisoned.”). 
 100 See Brief of Amicus Curiae 290 Criminal Law and Mental Health Professors in 
Support of Petitioner’s Request for Reversal and Remand at 3, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 
1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135) (arguing that abolishing insanity defense is unconstitutional). But 
see Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in 
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1243–46 (2000) (arguing for abolition). 
 101 Robert M. Wettstein & Edward P. Mulvey, Disposition of Insanity Acquittees in 
Illinois, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 11, 15 (1988) (reporting very low rates of 
malingering about insanity). 
 102 See Dorothy Otnow Lewis, Jonathan H. Pincus, Marilyn Feldman, Lori Jackson & 
Barbara Bard, Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death 
Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 841 (1986). 
 103 HENRY J. STEADMAN, MARGARET A. MCGREEVY, JOSEPH P. MORRISSEY, LISA A. 
CALLAHAN, PAMELA CLARK ROBBINS & CARMEN CIRINCIONE, BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: 
EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 28 (1993); see Morse, supra note 27, at 797 (“Few 
defendants ‘beat the rap’ with the insanity defense. There are little hard data for this claim, 
but it is best estimated that the insanity defense is raised in fewer than two percent of federal 
and state trials and is rarely successful.”). 
 104 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 8.4. 
 105 Mac McClelland, When ‘Not Guilty’ Is a Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 27, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/magazine/when-not-guilty-is-a-life-
sentence.html [https://perma.cc/L7CM-L6L4] (“[Insanity acquittees] often lost their freedom 
for twice as long as those actually convicted of the same offense.”). 
 106 See Michael R. Hawkins & Richard A. Pasewark, Characteristics of Persons Utilizing 
the Insanity Plea, 53 PSYCH. REP. 191, 194 (1983). 
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early could have unwelcome implications for the insanity defense more 
broadly. Selective news reporting largely informs the public’s skeptical 
perceptions of the insanity defense 107F107 and is “fueled by the supposed 
invisibility of mental illness.”108F108 We should resist fanning the flames.  
 
II. MEASURING MADNESS 
The criminal law presumes that we are all sane and responsible for our 
actions.109F109 It is on that basis that we can be punished when we commit 
crimes. The insanity defense, though, is criminal law’s acknowledgement 
that this presumption can be overcome. Mental impairment may cause moral 
impairment, and moral impairment may make punishment inappropriate. 110F110 
The defense is “the law’s conscientious efforts to place in a separate category 
people who cannot justly be held ‘responsible’ for their acts.”111F111 
Public opinion has contributed more to the history of the insanity 
defense than has the reasoned march of scientific progress. 112F112 Though 
contemporary Americans tend to be highly skeptical of the defense, 113F113 it has 
long been a fixture of criminal law. There is some debate about the defense’s 
true origins.114F114 Most scholars trace it to ancient Greek, Roman, or Hebrew 
 
 107 See NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, MYTHS AND REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 5 (1983). 
 108 Perlin, supra note 93, at 721. 
 109 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006) (“The presumption of sanity is equally 
universal . . . being (at least) a presumption that a defendant has the capacity to form the mens 
rea necessary for a verdict of guilt and the consequent criminal responsibility.”); Slobogin, 
supra note 100, at 1202 (“Accepting blameworthiness as the touchstone of the criminal law 
means that individual culpability must be assessed. That is where the kind of inquiry the 
insanity defense mandates comes into play. It is meant to help us decide who among those 
who commit criminal acts deserve to be the subject of criminal punishment.”). 
 110 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(d) (“[W]e would rebel at the notion of labeling as 
criminal those who are generally conceded not to be blameworthy.”). 
 111 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 112 Loren H. Roth, Preserve but Limit the Insanity Defense, 58 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 91, 91 
(1986–87) (“The evolution of the insanity defense over the centuries cannot be viewed as a 
march of scientific progress, but instead as a barometer of public and jurisprudential thinking 
about justice.”). 
 113 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS § 3:3, Westlaw 
(database updated May 2020) (“Despite society’s tacit acceptance of insanity as a disease in 
the medical realm of diagnosis and treatment, society has not been predisposed to extend the 
illness model to the legal forum.”); Mickenberg, supra note 98, at 965 (“Virtually every 
relevant survey reveals a deep-seated public antipathy to the NGRI verdict.”). 
 114 See Debra Wood, Ancient Origins – or Otherwise – of the Insanity Defense, 16 
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCH. & L. S145, S150–51 (2009) (arguing, contrary to common scholarly 
assertion, that ancient Greek law had no insanity defense). 
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law.115F115 From there, the insanity defense found its way to medieval British 
law,116F116 where it was a well-established part of the common law by the end of 
the Middle Ages.117F117 
Although the central insight of the insanity defense has always been that 
mental impairment can negate moral responsibility, the doctrinal test for 
mental impairment has changed over time. Early English legal commentators 
noted the defense’s existence, but there are few direct textual records of the 
legal standards courts used.118F118 One of the first—the “wild beast” test—comes 
from the early 18th century. 119F119 Edward Arnold was charged with the 
attempted murder of Lord Thomas Onslow in 1724.120F120 Arnold had shot 
Onslow in front of two witnesses. 121F121 There were several signs that things 
were not quite right with Arnold: he would hoot like an owl, put hot coals in 
his father’s food, and complain that Lord Onslow was living inside his 
belly.122F122 The judge instructed the jury that “a man that is totally deprived of 
his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more 
than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of 
punishment.”123F123 Though the jury convicted Arnold and the judge sentenced 
him to death, Lord Onslow interceded so that the punishment was reduced to 
life imprisonment.124F124 
 
 115 RUDOLPH JOSEPH GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 8 (1984); ARISTOTLE, 
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CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1965) (describing the historical origins of the wild beast test). 
 120 R v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 695 (Eng. 1724). 
 121 Id. at 699–700. 
 122 Id. at 733–34, 725–26, 731–32. 
 123 Id. at 765. 
 124 Id. at 765–66. 
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The modern doctrinal history of the insanity defense began more than a 
century later, in 1843, with M’Naghten.125F125 M’Naghten shot and killed the 
Prime Minister’s secretary, mistaking him for the Prime Minister. 126F126 In his 
defense, M’Naghten explained that the Prime Minister had been 
orchestrating a vast political conspiracy to kill him. 127F127 Mental health experts 
testified that M’Naghten suffered from paranoid delusions. 128F128 The judge 
accordingly instructed the jury on the insanity defense, setting forth what is, 
to this day, the best known insanity standard: any defendant who, at the time 
of his crime, was “labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of 
mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing: or if he 
did ‘know’ it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong,” is legally 
insane.129F129 The jury found M’Naghten “not guilty, by reason of insanity.” 130F130 
He lived out his days between the “criminal lunatic department” at Bedlam 
Hospital and the Broadmoor Asylum.131F131 
Though tests measuring insanity by the defendant’s inability to 
distinguish “right and wrong” existed since the early 1800s, 132F132 the 
“M’Naghten test” quickly became the standard throughout England. 133F133 Soon 
after, it migrated to the United States. By the middle of the 19th century, U.S. 
federal courts and many state courts had adopted the M’Naghten test. 134F134 
Before long, many became most.135F135 
The insanity defense’s history did not stabilize with the M’Naghten test. 
Following a slew of scholarly challenges to the test during the 1950s, the 
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 128 M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719. 
 129 Id. at 722. 
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release of the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) own test in 1962,136F136 and the 
passage of the federal Insanity Defense Reform Act in 1984, 137F137 the picture 
in the United States is much more complicated today. States have substantial 
leeway to shape their own tests, giving rise to a patchwork of different 
approaches.138F138 While five states—Alaska,139F139 Idaho,140F140 Kansas,141F141 
Montana,142F142 and Utah143F143—have abolished the defense, the remaining 
jurisdictions allow some combination of so-called “cognitive” and 
“volitional” tests.144F144 
Volitional tests are premised on the assumption that a defendant must 
have control of his actions to be responsible for them. Control serves as a 
constraint on liability throughout the criminal law. For example, criminal 
liability generally requires that a person acted voluntarily. 145F145 The duress 
excuse similarly recognizes that certain circumstances—e.g., coercion by 
another’s use of unlawful force 146F146—can impair control and render a person 
blameless.147F147 Volitional insanity tests provide an excuse when a mental 
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disease or defect sufficiently impairs a defendant’s control over a criminal 
act. 
Since the M’Naghten test was so influential and lacked a volitional 
component, volitional tests for insanity were rare 148F148 until relatively 
recently.149F149 By the mid-20th century, most U.S. jurisdictions had adopted 
some form of a volitional test.150F150 The most common formulation applied if a 
defendant experienced an “irresistible impulse” to engage in the underlying 
criminal conduct.151F151 Commentators criticized the starkly binary nature of 
that formulation of the test, which presumes that an impulse is either 
resistible or not.152F152 Accordingly, during the 1960s and ‘70s, many states 
turned to the ALI’s more nuanced version,153F153 according to which a defendant 
is legally insane if he “lack[ed] substantial capacity . . . to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.”154F154 By the early 1980s, every federal 
court to have considered the issue had also adopted a volitional test.155F155 
The volitional test’s dominance was short-lived. In 1982, John Hinkley 
attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan. 156F156 During his federal 
criminal trial, he raised the volitional prong of the insanity defense. He 
argued that his obsession with actress Jodi Foster deprived him of control 
over his actions.157F157 After Foster ignored his many letters, he felt compelled 
to assassinate the President to grab her attention and win her esteem.158F158 The 
jury bought it.159F159 His acquittal provoked national outrage and prompted 
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reflection.160F160 During the ensuing backlash against the volitional test, all but 
eighteen states and the District of Columbia abrogated it. 161F161 
Critics of the volitional test worry that it is so imprecise that it is 
virtually meaningless. All people feel urges, and all people have choices. 162F162 
So, why should we excuse some people’s urges? As the American Psychiatric 
Association put it: “The line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse 
not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk.” 163F163 
Many think psychology has little to add to this commonsense refrain: “There 
is no scientific measure of the strength of urges.”164F164 However, some 
psychologists today are more optimistic that recent advances in neuroscience 
and clinical research can help.165F165 Although these developments may not yet 
offer a numerical measure of control, they at least show that the capacity for 
control is no more difficult to assess than the cognitive capacities that other 
formulations of the insanity defense reference. 166F166 
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After discarding the volitional test, most states and the federal system 
only have a cognitive test for insanity. 167F167 Cognitive tests roughly say that a 
defendant may be excused if he was unable to understand his conduct in some 
important respect.168F168 “To qualify as a blameworthy moral agent,” the thought 
behind cognitive tests goes, “[an] individual must have the capacity to make 
moral judgments about what to do and how to be.” 169F169 The best-known 
formulation of the cognitive test is the M’Naghten standard quoted above, 
and many states still subscribe to it today. 170F170 Federal law is similar and 
applies if a defendant is “unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the 
wrongfulness of his acts.” 171F171 However, like the irresistible impulse test for 
control, M’Naghten’s requirement that a defendant lack all knowledge about 
the nature and quality of his actions is binary. “The M’Naghten rules 
fruitlessly attempt to relieve from punishment only those mentally diseased 
persons who have no cognitive capacity . . . . This formula does not comport 
with modern medical knowledge that an individual is a mentally complex 
being with varying degrees of awareness.” 172F172 Accordingly, the ALI’s test 
avoids the all-or-nothing language of M’Naghten and replaces it with a less 
stringent standard referring to “substantial capacity”:173F173 “A person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of 
mental disease or defect he lack[ed] substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the 
criminality his conduct.”174F174 Roughly half the states use the ALI’s version.175F175 
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The cognitive test’s critics point out that there are mental illnesses that 
leave a person cognitively intact but nonetheless deprive him of 
responsibility.176F176 For example, “[a] person who knew what he was doing was 
wrong, but who felt ‘compelled’ to commit the criminal act—say, a person 
suffering from kleptomania or manic-depressive psychosis—would be 
criminally punished [under a cognitive standard].” 177F177 The significant 
advantage of cognitive tests is supposed to be that, unlike volitional tests, 
they are more amenable to psychiatric analysis. 178F178 It is unclear, though, 
whether this is true.179F179 Regardless, it is also far from obvious that introducing 
more psychiatric analysis into the courtroom is a good thing, since it may 
distract from what the insanity defense is really about. “[T]he insanity 
defense’s biggest problem is that it has been ‘over-scienced.’ In the 
end . . . legal insanity is a legal and moral policy judgment, not a particular 
empirical fact.”180F180 
Moral considerations have dominated the history of justification and 
critique of the insanity defense in both its formulations. 181F181 “[M]inimal 
rationality (a cognitive capacity) and minimal self-control or lack of 
compulsion (a volitional capacity) are the essential preconditions for 
responsibility.”182F182 The moral case shows how both tests for insanity promote 
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criminal law’s retributive goal, i.e., to give criminals what they deserve. 183F183 
A person who is not responsible for a crime deserves no punishment for it. 184F184 
The full modern case for the insanity defense rests on showing how it 
also promotes the other three major justifications for criminal punishment: 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.185F185 I address each in turn. 
Deterrence is effectively an economic theory of criminal law. 186F186 It views both 
would-be and actual criminals as rational actors who try to maximize benefits 
and minimize costs.187F187 On this theory, the goal of criminal law is to prevent 
crime by increasing the expected costs of criminal mischief. 188F188 Criminal law 
does this by imposing punishment when crime is discovered. 189F189 The law 
hopes both to deter the criminal himself from reoffending (specific 
deterrence) and to deter other would-be criminals (general deterrence) by 
displaying the legal consequences of misconduct.190F190 
The logic of deterrence seems to require punishment for all criminals; 
however, this is not necessarily the case for volitionally- or cognitively-
impaired offenders.191F191 As to general deterrence, most would-be criminals are 
unlikely to identify with insane offenders. 192F192 If people do not see themselves 
as potentially standing in a defendant’s shoes, facing the same punishment, 
they will draw no implications for their own conduct. As to specific 
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deterrence, “[t]hose who are substantially unable to restrain their conduct are, 
by definition, undeterrable.”193F193 Criminals must have some control over their 
conduct if the sort of cost–benefit calculus at the heart of deterrence theory 
is to have any effect. They must also be able to understand which courses of 
conduct will trigger criminal sanction. Insane defendants who fail the 
cognitive test lack that capacity, and they will not acquire it through 
punishment.194F194 
Rehabilitation and incapacitation also favor excusing the criminally 
insane. Prisons are poorly suited for people with mental illness. Since they 
typically lack adequate mental health facilities, prisons are incapable of 
treating or rehabilitating insane inmates. 195F195 Nor does locking up mentally ill 
criminals incapacitate them from harming others. It just relocates their 
destructive behavior from the general public to the prison population, where 
criminal activity resumes.196F196 Inexpert treatment at prison facilities often 
works against any rehabilitative ambitions by exacerbating mental illness. 197F197 
The better approach, so far as rehabilitation and incapacitation are concerned, 
is to keep mentally ill criminals out of prison and keep them in mental health 
facilities, which are best equipped to treat and (as necessary) restrain them. 198F198 
To summarize, there are two general legal tests for insanity. Volitional 
tests require that the defendant lacked the (substantial) capacity to control his 
behavior. Cognitive tests require that the defendant lacked the (substantial) 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Although there are 
jurisdictional variations in the phrasing of the tests, nothing below will turn 
on precise wording. The criminal justice case for either test turns on its ability 
to distinguish sane criminals—whose punishment promotes retribution, 
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deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation—from insane criminals—
whose punishment does not further those ends. 
To justify extending the insanity defense to corporations with 
“volitional” or “cognitive” deficits, I ultimately need to argue that punishing 
such corporations conflicts with the four basic purposes of criminal law. 
First, though, I must show that corporations can satisfy the volitional and 
cognitive tests for insanity. That will require some background from 
corporate law, psychology, organizational science, and economics on the 
sorts of pathologies that can affect corporations. I turn to that background 
next. 
III. LEGALLY INSANE CORPORATIONS 
If, as the law presupposes, corporations have minds, can those minds be 
disordered in ways that meet the insanity defense’s requirements? State and 
federal law codify the insanity defense, so presumably statutory text and 
purpose should dictate the answer. Nothing in the statutory language 
excludes corporate defendants. The law opens the defense to any “person” 199F199 
or “defendant,”200F200 terms that include corporations. 
The muddier issue is whether corporations can ever satisfy the elements 
of the defense. “Insanity” is a legal term. If the law defined “insanity” in 
terms of organic brain abnormalities, corporations would be disqualified 
automatically. As explained in the previous Part, the law takes a different 
approach, characterizing insanity as a defect that sufficiently inhibits volition 
or cognition. While corporations may not initially seem to have volition or 
cognition any more than they have organic brains, those concepts have a 
specific understanding within the context of the insanity defense. On that 
understanding, there are organizational features that are intuitively 
compelling corporate equivalents of volition and cognition. There are 
organizational defects that can inhibit them. These include rogue employees 
who commit isolated, self-serving crimes (discussed in Part III.A) and 
corporate cultures so defective that they distorts employees’ capacity to 
reason ethically (discussed in Part III.B). As argued below, corporations with 
these conditions would satisfy the statutory requirements under volitional 
and cognitive tests, respectively. Recognizing a defense for them would 
advance the basic goals of criminal justice. 
 
 199 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. L. INST. 2019). 
 200 18 U.S.C. § 17(a). 
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A. SATISFYING THE VOLITIONAL TEST 
It may at first sound like a conceptual mistake to suggest that 
corporations can satisfy the volitional test for insanity. Corporations are not 
true moral agents, even if they are people within the fiction of the law. 201F201 
They do not have free will.202F202 So how could corporations suffer a defect of 
will? 
These intuitions are powerful but misleading. The volitional test is not 
about will, free or otherwise.203F203 Rather, it is about the important role of 
control as a precondition of criminal liability—a defendant who cannot 
control his actions is beyond blame.204F204 However odd it may be to speak of 
corporate will, corporate control is much more natural. Indeed, corporate 
control over employee action goes to the very heart of the agency principles 
that motivate respondeat superior liability.205F205 The corporation—by virtue of 
 
 201 This claim is common sense but deeply controversial. Compare Peter A. French, The 
Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 207 (1979) (“I hope to provide the 
foundation of a theory that allows treatment of corporations as members of the moral 
community, of equal standing with the traditionally acknowledged residents: biological 
human beings . . . .”), with Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance 
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (1982) (“Since it is a legal fiction, a corporation is 
incapable of having social or moral obligations . . . .”). If I am wrong and corporations truly 
are moral agents, my argument that they should be able to benefit from the insanity defense 
only becomes easier. 
 202 Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA. 
L. REV. 443, 473 (2005) (“A free will test is particularly useless, and particularly ridiculous, 
when the free will in question is that of an entity such as a corporation.”); Edwin M. 
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1926) (“[I]t is 
astonishing for how many centuries the theory of fault resting on an alleged free will served 
to relieve corporations, public and private, of responsibility in tort.”). 
 203 This is despite some theorists’ claims to the contrary. See, e.g., LeBlanc, supra note 
56, at 1316 (“The criminally insane offender is characterized by a complete absence of free 
will over his actions.”). 
 204 See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006) (“The volitional incapacity or 
irresistible-impulse test . . . asks whether a person was so lacking in volition due to a mental 
defect or illness that he could not have controlled his actions.”); United States v. Lyons, 739 
F.2d 994, 1000 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (“When a defendant is properly acquitted 
by reason of insanity under the control test, the guilty does not go free . . . . [For] those few 
unfortunate persons so afflicted by mental disease that they knew what the law forbade but 
couldn’t control their actions sufficiently to avoid violating it[,] [t]he nature of their illness 
makes punishment useless . . . .”). 
 205 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1958) (“The 
assumption of control is a usual basis for imposing tort liability when the thing controlled 
causes harm.”). 
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its theoretical control over employee conduct—is held vicariously liable for 
conduct taken within the scope of employment.206F206 
The volitional test defines the relevant notion of control in terms of 
“capacities” (which corporations have) rather than “wills” (which 
corporations lack).207F207 Any defendant that “lacks substantial capacity . . . to 
conform [its] conduct to the requirements of [the] law” is legally insane. 208F208 
Since, according to respondeat superior, corporate conduct is just employee 
conduct, any corporation that lacks the substantial capacity to get its 
employees to obey the law should qualify. The question of whether 
corporations can ever satisfy the volitional test becomes: Can it ever be that 
a corporation lacked the substantial capacity to control an employee who 
commits the crime on the job? 
Having now translated the volitional test to the corporate context, it is 
much easier to see how a corporation might satisfy it. Suppose, for example, 
that a corporation has in place a stellar compliance program that trains 
employees about the law’s requirements and monitors their adherence to 
legal and ethical norms. Suppose further that the program significantly 
exceeds industry standards and has all the features that any informed 
prosecutor would think to recommend. The DOJ’s “Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations” offer some insight into what some of 
those features would be: “comprehensiveness,” “disciplinary action [against 
past violators],” “revisions to [the] corporate compliance program,” 
“promptness of any disclosure of wrongdoing to the government,” “internal 
audit functions,” and “information and reporting system[s].”209F209 This 
hypothetical corporation has all of those features. 
Now suppose that one of the compliant corporation’s employees 
subverts its robust compliance program and commits a crime. The 
 
 206 Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal 
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1645 (1990); see 
also Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism 
and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 868–69 n.23 (2003) (“There is 
also an emerging notion that artificial persons, like natural persons, must control themselves 
in a manner that comports with civilized society and the behavioral rules by which it is 
governed.”). 
 207 I set aside the older “irresistible impulse” formulation of the volitional test because it 
is not clear that corporations have impulses in any interesting sense. Under respondeat 
superior, corporate impulses are the impulses of its employees. A corporation with an 
employee who, because of an irresistible impulse, commits a crime might derivatively claim 
the same insanity defense that would protect the employee. 
 208 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019). 
 209 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Just., 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter 
Thompson Memo]. 
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compliance literature refers to such employees as “rogues.” 210F210 As even the 
DOJ recognizes, every corporation faces a risk of rogue employees: “[N]o 
compliance program can ever prevent all criminal activity by a corporation’s 
employees.”211F211 Corporations cannot monitor their employees perfectly,212F212 so 
there is always a chance that some misconduct will go undetected, especially by 
motivated rogues.213F213 This is the economic reality of agency costs—the 
inevitable divergence of employee and corporate interests (discussed in Part 
IV.B.1). Agency costs can be mitigated by efforts to align incentives, to monitor 
more heavily, or to sanction employee misconduct, but they can never be 
eliminated.214F214 
One company that serves as a real-world example of this dilemma is 
Siemens AG.215F215 After an extensive international investigation into alleged 
foreign bribery,216F216 Siemens pled guilty in 2008 to one of the largest-ever 
public corruption scandals.217F217 As part of its plea agreement, Siemens agreed 
 
 210 George R. Skupski, The Senior Management Mens Rea: Another Stab at a Workable 
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control the subordinate’s conduct.”). 
 211 Thompson Memo, supra note 209, at 9; see also Hasnas, supra note 85, at 1343–44 
(“But all managers know that no matter how good their organization’s internal controls may 
be, they cannot ensure that no rogue employee will intentionally violate the law . . . .”). 
 212 See Henry L. Tosi, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia & Debra L. Moody, The Separation of 
Ownership and Control: Increasing the Responsiveness of Boards of Directors to 
Shareholders’ Interests?, 4 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 46 (1991) (“[E]ven if the principle 
[sic] is willing to incur agency costs of monitoring, it may still be difficult to effectively 
control agents.”); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 780–81 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 n.10 (1976). 
 213 See Irwin Schwartz, Toward Improving the Law and Policy of Corporate Criminal 
Liability and Sanctions, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 112 (2014) (“No organization—private or 
government—can prevent all misconduct by all employees, all of the time.”). 
 214 See infra notes 392–99 and accompanying text. 
 215 SIEMENS, https://new.siemens.com/global/en.html [https://perma.cc/A2EE-S7BY] 
(last visitedFeb. 15, 2021). 
 216 See Information, United States v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina), No. 1:08-cr-367-RJL 
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/20
13/05/02/12-12-08siemensargen-info.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM3U-ZQE6]. 
 217 Department’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1, United States v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2013/05/02/12-12-08siemensvenez-sent.pdf 
[hereinafter Siemens Sentencing Memo].] [https://perma.cc/QG4T-XZYL]. Brandon Garrett 
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to work closely with government monitors to implement new and 
dramatically expanded compliance protocols. 218F218 Siemens became a 
governmental partner and catalyst for change by requiring all of its business 
partners to have similar anti-corruption standards.219F219 The efforts were a great 
success. After its reforms, Siemens was hailed by the DOJ as having “set a 
high standard for multi-national companies to follow.”220F220 Despite Siemens’ 
600-person compliance department, industry leading Anti-Corruption Toolkit, 
and additional compliance controls in high-risk jurisdictions, reports of rogue 
activity soon resurfaced. 221F221 In its 2013 SEC filings, Siemens reported internal 
and public investigations into public corruption connected to its activities in 
Kuwait, the Caribbean, Central Asia, Turkey, Iraq, Brazil, Argentina, Greece, 
Switzerland, Austria, Venezuela, South Africa, Thailand, and Bangladesh.2 22F222 
As a matter of black-letter law, compliance programs presently have no 
impact on a corporation’s criminal liability. The DOJ’s official position is that 
“[a] corporate compliance program, even one specifically prohibiting the 
very conduct in question, does not absolve the corporation from criminal 
liability.”223F223 Federal courts have reinforced this stance: “[A] compliance 
program, however extensive, does not immunize the corporation from 
liability when its employees . . . fail to comply with the law.”224F224 Thus, despite 
world-class compliance investments, Siemens remains chargeable for bribery by 
a rogue employee wherever and whenever it occurs. 
A corporation plagued by a rogue employee despite having a robust 
compliance program “lack[s] [the] substantial capacity to . . . conform [its] 
conduct to the requirements of [the] law.” 225F225 For individuals, efforts to 
conform to the law take the form of psychological resolve. A person who, 
 
offers an effective treatment of the Siemens case throughout his book Too Big to Jail. See 
generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS (2014) (discussing Siemens extensively). 
 218 Siemens Sentencing Memo, supra note 217, at 11. 
 219 Id. at 22–24. 
 220 Id. at 24. 
 221 Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 
WIS. L. REV. 609, 614–15 (2012). 
 222 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Form 20-F Annual Report at 40–42 (Nov. 27, 2013), 
https://www.siemens.com/investor/pool/en/investor_relations/financial_publications/sec_fili
ngs/2013/20_f.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2ZN-2KV7]. 
 223 Thompson Memo, supra note 209, at 9. 
 224 United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989); 
see also United States v. Ionia Mgmt., 555 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e refuse to adopt 
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prove as a separate element in its case-in-chief that the corporation lacked effective policies 
and procedures to deter and detect criminal actions by its employees.”). 
 225 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019). 
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despite evincing substantial resolve not to take others’ property, ends up 
stealing something, could suffer from kleptomania and be a candidate for an 
insanity defense to theft.226F226 Corporations show equivalent effort by 
implementing well-meaning compliance programs designed to prevent 
employee misconduct.227F227 Greater expense and more extensive protocols 
correlate to increased corporate effort. 228F228 
When rogue employees subvert extensive compliance efforts, their 
employers lack the substantial capacity to control them. Though, in 
hindsight, it may appear that some additional compliance protocol could have 
prevented the misconduct,229F229 that fact shows only that the corporation had 
some capacity for control, not that it had substantial capacity. The presence 
of a robust compliance program is important. A corporation with a limited 
program would have a difficult time proving that it lacked the substantial 
capacity to control a rogue because it did not expend much effort. 230F230 
Not only does our hypothetical corporation satisfy the language of the 
volitional test for insanity, giving it a defense for rogue conduct also 
promotes criminal law’s fundamental goals. It is “inherently inequitable” 231F231 
as a retributive matter to sanction a corporation—and by extension all its 
stakeholders—when it acts “with the best of motives, with the best of efforts, 
 
 226 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 461 (5th ed. 2013) (noting that kleptomaniacs suffer from “problems in both 
emotional and behavioral regulation”). 
 227 Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, 
and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1160 (1983) (“[O]rganizational offenders cannot exert 
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 228 Mihailis Diamantis, Functional Corporate Knowledge, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 
374–75 (2019) (defining corporate effort). 
 229 See Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281, 1316 (2011) (“[T]he fact that fraud occurred will be used as 
evidence that internal compliance failed and that the failure was avoidable.”). 
 230 See Richard S. Gruner & Louis M. Brown, Organizational Justice: Recognizing and 
Rewarding the Good Citizen Corporation, 21 J. CORP. L. 731, 763–64 (1996) (discussing how 
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 231 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 206, at 1653 (“For the government to recommend—
or require—compliance programs and then dismiss them as irrelevant has an inherently 
inequitable ring.”); see also Lucian E. Dervan, Re-Evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability: 
The DOJ’s Internal Moral Culpability Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON 
L. REV. 7, 17–18 (2011) (noting that in such cases, corporations lack the “moral culpability 
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and with the utmost in ‘due diligence’” 232F232 Cognitive scientists know that 
people ordinarily think about corporate blameworthiness in the same way 
they think about human blameworthiness. 233F233 When individuals take 
extensive precautions and nonetheless find themselves on the wrong side of 
the law, we generally recognize their blamelessness. 234F234 Similarly, 
corporations that do the same are not “worthy of criminal sanction.” 235F235 
Criminal law also has no deterrent interest in punishing such 
corporations. As former Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson has 
remarked, “[I]f you really want to have a deterrence of corporate criminal 
liability, the best weapon against corporate misconduct is establishing an 
effective compliance program.”236F236 The sort of corporation presently under 
consideration already has an effective compliance program. So, the criminal 
law already deters the corporation as much as it could hope. Punishing such 
corporations risks undermining deterrence by discouraging corporations 
from undergoing the expense of implementing robust compliance in the first 
place.237F237 For the same reason, the criminal law has no interest in 
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rehabilitating or incapacitating corporations that already have effective 
compliance programs. 
Several scholars have proposed a defense for corporate criminals—the 
due diligence defense—that would often overlap with the insanity defense 
proposed here. 238F238 The due diligence defense would allow a corporation’s 
“compliance program [to] operate as a defense against corporate criminal 
liability.” 239F239 Where a corporate criminal defendant could show that it had an 
otherwise effective compliance program, the due diligence defense would 
allow it to avoid conviction. The Model Penal Code includes a limited 
version of this defense.240F240 
The volitional prong of the corporate insanity defense overlaps with, but 
is ultimately more nuanced than, the due diligence defense. Every 
corporation that would benefit from the due diligence defense would likely 
also qualify for the insanity defense. The reverse is not true. A robust 
compliance program targeted at preventing the sort of crime with which the 
corporate defendant is charged is not an absolute requirement of the insanity 
defense. Of course, having such a compliance program significantly 
strengthens the corporation’s case that it lacked the substantial capacity to 
control its rogue employee. It is to be expected that most corporations that 
successfully mount an insanity defense would have effective compliance 
programs in place. But the corporate insanity defense could also be available 
in two circumstances to corporate defendants that lack a compliance 
program. The first circumstance is where no reasonable program would have 
prevented the misconduct anyway. For example, a technologically-
sophisticated and motivated rogue may purposely compromise his 
employers’ automated compliance protocols to effectuate his crime. The 
second is where the sort of misconduct, while perhaps preventable with the 
right program, was not foreseeable. For example, a compliance program 
might address all manner of misconduct pertinent to ordinary business 
operations, but a rogue employee may divert business resources to pursue 
unrelated misconduct that his employer could neither reasonably predict nor 
reasonably prevent. The due diligence defense would not kick in for either of 
 
 238 See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 221, at 611; Podgor, supra note232, at 1538; Steven M. 
Kowal, Vicarious Corporate Liability: Judges Should Credit Diligent Compliance When 
Evaluating Criminal Intent, 24 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 1, 4 (2009) (“Companies should not be 
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 239 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 206, at 1652. 
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these cases.241F241 The insanity defense provides room for corporations in these 
two circumstances to argue that they nonetheless lacked the substantial 
capacity to control their employees. It thereby puts the criminal law in a 
better position to refrain from asking corporations to do that which is not 
reasonably possible. 
The insanity defense has one other crucial advantage over the due 
diligence defense: it requires no new law in jurisdictions that endorse the 
volitional test for insanity. If, as argued here, corporations can satisfy the test, 
judges could implement the corporate insanity defense without waiting for 
legislative action. This is not so with the due diligence defense. Scholars have 
touted the due diligence defense for more than forty years.242F242 To this day, 
“[i]n the American legal system, a due diligence defense is not common for 
legal bodies.”243F243 Quicker progress could be made with the corporate insanity 
defense. 
B. SATISFYING THE COGNITIVE TEST 
Can a corporation “lack[] substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the 
criminality of [its] conduct?” 244F244 After translating the cognitive test to the 
corporate context, it becomes easier to see how this capacity could be 
compromised in a corporation. An individual who satisfies the cognitive test 
for insanity may “understand the physical nature and consequences of his act, 
but not its legal or moral character.” 245F245 According to respondeat superior, 
corporations only understand or appreciate things when their employees do. 
This means that a corporation whose employees fail to appreciate the 
criminality of their collective conduct may be a candidate for an insanity 
defense under the cognitive test. 
Organizational scientists have long recognized that “[o]rganisations are 
systems . . . not just aggregations of individuals.”246F246 For example, corporate 
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culture is a feature of the organization itself. 247F247 Though it is not a feature of 
the individuals who compose the organization, it is a critical factor that 
influences how employees behave and think. 248F248 Corporate culture relates to 
shared understandings, practices, and histories that bring some features of the 
environment to social salience. 249F249 Factors that influence a corporation’s 
culture include its hierarchy, goals and policies, treatment of prior offenses, 
efforts to educate employees on compliance with the law, and compensation 
scheme.250F250 Individual employees adapt to corporate culture, 251F251 which in turn 
can influence whether they engage in criminal conduct. 252F252 For example, a 
high-pressure environment oriented toward quotas and production goals with 
little emphasis on legal or ethical limits can foster malfeasance, even among 
individuals not otherwise disposed to misbehave.253F253 
Defective corporate culture can have a normalizing effect on individual 
misconduct.254F254 Morally extraordinary behavior can come to seem 
commonplace, ordinary, and banal.255F255 People look to the behavior of those 
around them for cues about what behavior is acceptable and what behavior is 
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not.256F256 Once microcultural and situational conditions push employee 
behavior in an unethical direction, the effects can snowball. 257F257 Employees in 
such environments may find their moral senses dulled. This can impair their 
capacity to appreciate the potential criminality of the conduct of those around 
them, conduct in which they themselves also engage. “[R]egular 
people . . . succumb to the pressure of situational coercion[,] . . . people who 
had no prior intention to do anything wrong.” 258F258 
For example, in 2016, news broke that Wells Fargo had, for several 
years, opened a large number of false accounts without customers’ 
knowledge or permission.259F259 This violated the Consumer Finance Protection 
Act of 2010.260F260 Internal investigations revealed the problem’s source: a high-
pressure sales culture that encouraged retail employees to open eight 
accounts for every customer regardless of need. 261F261 By some reports, “[t]he 
fraud seems to have stemmed from CEO John Stumpf’s mantra to 
employees: ‘eight is great.’”262F262 But the motto long preceded Stumpf. 
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Northwest Corporation, a bank that merged with Wells Fargo in 1998, 263F263 
originated the “Going for Gr-Eight” theme.264F264 According to one former 
Northwest executive, “It was a religion. It very much was the culture.”265F265 
The high-pressure quota culture perpetuated itself after the merger: 
“The better [employees] did at sales, the more they advanced, so it got spread 
across the company. An entire generation of managers thrived in the culture, 
got rewarded for it, and [came to] positions of power.” 266F266 Individual bankers 
who perceived the ethical problems with this “gaming” (manipulating sales 
for compensation) would quit (or be fired for underperformance), and the 
beat would go on.267F267 The practice became fully normalized: “[N]obody 
seemed to care.”268F268 
The toxic culture at Wells Fargo was bigger than any individual 
employee. It was systemic. Indeed, it may even have been bigger than Wells 
Fargo itself. Commenting when the scandal broke, Hillary Clinton saw it as 
a symptom of the broader “‘culture of misconduct and recklessness’ in the 
banking system.”269F269 It is not hard to understand how ordinary, well-
intentioned Wells Fargo recruits could eventually lose their way. 270F270 
Corporate culture can compromise a corporation’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of its conduct without necessitating that its 
employees are also legally insane. Recall that legal insanity must arise from 
a disease or defect. While a toxic corporate culture impacts how both 
employees and corporations distinguish right from wrong, it is only a defect 
of the corporation. Culture is a social phenomenon beyond the control of any 
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single individual.271F271 People exist within culture, and their susceptibility to its 
effects is a normal adaptive mechanism of human psychology. 272F272 While we 
may commiserate with Wells Fargo’s employees for other reasons (perhaps 
they were coerced to do wrong), they were not insane. 
The cognitive test’s biggest challenge is not whether corporations can 
satisfy it, but whether it makes sense to excuse corporations that do. Wells 
Fargo is not sympathetic. As I have argued elsewhere, corporations with toxic 
internal cultures often seem like they are paradigmatic examples of evil 
deserving the harshest responses.273F273 Overcoming our strong punitive 
instincts is a broader challenge that the cognitive test for insanity must meet. 
Even for individuals, the line between the inability to appreciate moral wrong 
and actually being morally wrong—between insanity and evil—can seem too 
fine. One skeptical judge opined: “[T]hat which is sometimes called ‘moral,’ 
or ‘emotional insanity,’ savors too much of a seared conscience, or atrocious 
wickedness, to be entertained as a legal defense.” 274F274 
The criminal justice case for permitting a cognitive test for corporate 
insanity does not turn on fairness considerations toward the corporate 
defendant because it cannot. As I argue extensively below, 275F275 applying the 
cognitive test may sometimes be fairest to victims. The full argument draws 
on what the corporate insanity defense would look like in practice—how 
corporations assert it and what happens if they are successful—which I lay 
out in Part V. For now, I can only note the conclusion: allowing the cognitive 
test for corporate insanity could secure more trials of corporate wrongdoing 
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and better protect future potential victims by ensuring meaningful corporate 
reform. 
One might worry that the cognitive test for corporate insanity would 
open the path for corporate gamesmanship. For example, some corporations 
might purposely induce cultural defects to immunize themselves from 
liability. This worry is not unique to the corporate context. A similar concern 
arises for individuals, who could also purposely induce cognitive defects 
(say, by taking intoxicants) before committing crime. With respect to 
individuals, the law has solved this problem by disqualifying voluntarily-
induced insanity.276F276 The same rule would apply to corporations: no 
corporation that purposely instigates its own cognitive failings by 
consciously promoting a criminogenic culture would qualify for the insanity 
defense. Other scholars have pointed to the important difference between 
“accidental” or “planned” corporate dysfunction for purposes of assessing 
corporate culpability.277F277 A corporation whose managers purposely craft a 
criminogenic corporate culture to free its employees from law-abiding 
psychological inhibitions would have no defense. Only corporations whose 
cognitive deficiencies arose organically, as it were, without a directing hand, 
could benefit from an insanity defense. 
Even with purposely-induced defects excluded, another concern is 
whether too many corporations would qualify for the defense. This concern 
will be especially salient to people who are skeptical of corporations’ 
willingness and ability to encourage ethical behavior from their employees. 
There is good cause for skepticism. As argued in the next Part, destructive 
and bizarre behavior is essentially unavoidable for organizations like 
corporations. Corporate law is a significant source of the problem because of 
the way it understands what counts as a legitimate corporate purpose and who 
is authorized to pursue that purpose on behalf of the corporation. Fortunately, 
as the next Part also discusses, there are several limitations internal to the 
corporate insanity defense that constrain its application. The best way to 
address significant swaths of corporate misconduct likely lies outside of the 
criminal justice system, in corporate law and mental health treatment for 
employees. 
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IV. THE ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY OF CORPORATE PATHOLOGY 
This Article is far from the first to view corporations through an 
interpretive lens according to which they are intelligent organisms. For the 
better part of a century, economists have used biological and psychological 
models to diagnose corporations as healthy or pathological. The best-known 
expositor of such theories, Edith Penrose, turned to biology in an effort to 
abstract away from “human motives” and understand firm success and 
failure.278F278 She saw firm growth as “a process of development, akin to natural 
biological processes in which an interacting series of internal changes leads 
to increases in size accompanied by changes in the characteristics of the 
growing object.”279F279 Economist Kevin Boulding advanced two competing 
biological models of firm health as a kind of equilibrium: the “life cycle” 
theory, which sees firms as ecosystems, 280F280 and the “homeostasis theory,” 
which sees firms as organisms. 281F281 Armen Alchain’s viability analysis sees 
firms as products of evolution and natural selection; health is market 
survivability.282F282 
Critics point out that pure biological models of firms fail to appreciate 
that firms do not behave like animals, “unconscious . . . [and] without much 
deliberation.”283F283 Rather, corporations have the capacity to respond to their 
environment in rational ways. This means that any complete model of the 
firm must account for its motivating psychology. 284F284 
Economists and psychologists have obliged. More than two decades 
ago, the American Psychological Association recognized industrial-
organizational psychology as one of seventeen specialties in professional 
psychology.285F285 Among other topics, organizational psychologists study how 
group behavior arises from organizational culture and individual 
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interactions.286F286 Economists have also provided numerous psychologizing 
models of collective rationality and irrationality.287F287 
Psychology and economics can be tools for understanding healthy 
corporate function and diagnosing corporate deviance. Though the law 
explicitly subscribes to the fiction that corporations have minds, 
psychologists and economists do not usually claim that corporations actually 
have subjective points of view or human-like psychology.288F288 The 
psychologizing perspective that psychologists and economists offer is an aid 
to fleshing out what the law’s fictional stance entails. By modeling 
businesses as collectives possessing mental attributes, psychology and 
economics can help identify when and why corporations behave in ways they 
should not. 
What the models suggest is dispiriting. The law seems to predispose 
corporations to behave in pathological ways. This Part considers two salient 
examples: psychopathy and self-destructive behavior. Both can have 
criminogenic effects. If the corporate insanity defense applied to these 
prevalent corporate conditions, it would pose a serious threat to corporate 
criminal law and the interests it protects. As discussed, though, the 
prevalence of these conditions disqualifies them. The insanity defense only 
applies to “diseases” or “defects,” terms that demand a certain level of 
abnormality. If the law is to address these underlying sources of corporate 
misbehavior, it must look outside of the criminal justice system. 
A. CORPORATE PSYCHOPATHY 
During the 1980s, Ford Motor Company performed a simple economic 
calculation that tipped the scale in favor of killing many customers. 289F289 The 
company knew that minor traffic accidents could cause its new Pinto model’s 
fuel tank to leak and explode. 290F290 Of forty rear-impact tests that Ford 
 
 286 See Wood, Roberts & Whelan, supra note 271, at 233–34. 
 287 See infra notes 382–389 and accompanying text. 
 288 See generally William W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989) (discussing managerialist and 
contractual conceptions of the firm). See also Keith A. Lavine & Elna S. Moore, Corporate 
Consciousness: Defining the Paradigm, 10 J. BUS. & PSYCH. 401, 402 (1996) (“[C]orporate 
consciousness . . . is not so much metaphysical as it is cognitive.”). 
 289 Estimates range from 27 to 180 deaths. See Ben Wojdyla, The Top Automotive 
Engineering Failures: The Ford Pinto Fuel Tanks, POPULAR MECHANICS (May 20, 2011), 
https://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/a6700/top-automotive-engineering-failures-ford-
pinto-fuel-tanks/ [https://perma.cc/T65T-E2VP]. 
 290 Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 1977), https://www.motherjones.
com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness/ [https://perma.cc/PS7Y-ARVQ] (noting that “Ford 
 
2021] THE CORPORATE INSANITY DEFENSE 45 
conducted, every one occurring at more than twenty-five miles per hour 
resulted in a “ruptured fuel tank.” 291F291 Internal memoranda showed that an 
inexpensive safety device (a $1 plastic “baffle”) would have prevented the 
lethal gas leaks.292F292 But economic forecasts uncovered an even cheaper 
approach: paying civil damages for wrongful deaths.293F293 Ford assigned a 
dollar value for each human life: $200,000 (in 1970s dollars). 294F294 Between 27 
and 180 people (estimates vary) burned to death in Pintos. 295F295 
During the late 2000s, the Peanut Corporation of America (“PCA”) 
killed nine people296F296 and sickened many hundreds more, most of them 
children.297F297 PCA knew this would happen.298F298 Its peanut butter was tainted 
with salmonella, a potentially life-threatening intestinal infection.299F299 “Most 
people . . . [get] salmonella by eating foods . . . contaminated by feces,” 
often because farmers hydrate their fields with dirty water. 300F300 The 
contamination was no surprise to anyone who had seen PCA’s facility. 
Federal investigators discovered roaches, mold, and a leaking roof. 301F301 PCA 
itself detected salmonella at least twelve times during the months leading up 
to the outbreak and did nothing. 302F302 Publicly announcing the contamination 
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would have damaged PCA’s reputation and would have required a costly 
product recall. Cleaning the production lines would have brought its own 
costs and delays. Instead, PCA continued business as usual, sending its 
peanut butter to customers while falsely assuring them that the shipments 
were safe.303F303 According to the U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case, the 
explanation was simple: “corporate greed.”304F304 
Ford’s and PCA’s behavior, devoid of concern for the suffering of 
others, bears more than a passing resemblance to psychopathic behavior. 305F305 
Organizational psychologists have used personality disorder diagnostic 
criteria in systems analysis for years. 306F306 Dr. Robert Hare’s Psychopathy 
Checklist–Revised (“PCL-R”) is the gold standard for diagnosing 
psychopathy.307F307  PCL-R consists of eighteen traits and behaviors including: 
pathological lying, shallow affect, criminal versatility, lack of empathy, and 
irresponsibility.308F308 The fourth and fifth editions of the Diagnostic and 
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Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) provide diagnostic criteria 
that largely overlap with Dr. Hare’s. 309F309 Although there are no accepted 
clinical criteria for diagnosing organizations with psychopathy, 310F310 Dr. Hare 
believes that psychopathy is a helpful lens through which one can understand 
corporate misconduct and the psychological mechanisms that lead to it. 311F311 
1. The Law’s Role in Fostering Corporate Psychopathy 
In a sense, Ford and PCA were behaving as corporations should. Indeed, 
some commentators emphasize just how typical Ford’s actions were. 312F312 
According to corporate law’s doctrine of shareholder primacy, corporations 
are supposed to maximize shareholder wealth without regard to humanistic 
considerations.313F313 Human lives have no intrinsic value in this calculus; they 
are the equivalent of some number of plastic baffles. Although corporations 
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must always obey the law,314F314 reducing all other decisions to matters of profit 
can blur legal and moral lines. 
Coincidentally, the doctrine of shareholder primacy traces its legal roots 
to another case involving Ford from sixty years before the first Pinto rolled 
off the assembly line.315F315 During the early 20th century, Ford accumulated 
significant capital surpluses that it wanted to use for philanthropic purposes: 
to employ more people and lower the cost of its cars even further. 316F316 Henry 
Ford, the company’s president and majority stockholder, described the 
objective: “My ambition . . . is to employ still more men; to spread the 
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them 
build up their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting the greatest 
share of our profits back into the business.” 317F317 But putting profits back into 
the business meant they were not paid as dividends to shareholders expecting 
a cut. This, the Michigan Supreme Court told the company, it could not do: 
“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit 
of the stockholders . . . . [I]t is not within the lawful powers of a board of 
directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely 
incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting 
others.”318F318 It may be little surprise, then, that Ford Motor Company would 
put profit over all else decades later. 
The shareholder primacy principle is not the only source of corporate 
psychopathy. Since corporate law attributes the actions and thoughts of 
employees to their corporate employers, it stands to reason that a corporation 
with psychopathic employees will itself exhibit psychopathic behavior. As it 
turns out, there are a lot of psychopathic employees, particularly in 
management positions. One percent of the general population are 
psychopaths,319F319 which equates to roughly 3.3 million people in the United 
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States.320F320 The incidence of psychopathy among corporate managers is ten-
fold higher.321F321 Psychologists and business scholars who study the 
phenomenon call these managers “corporate psychopaths” 322F322 (which they 
distinguish from managers who merely foster generalized workplace 
toxicity).323F323 Corporate psychopaths have been on psychologists’ radars for 
decades.324F324 According to one prominent theory, corporate psychopaths are 
so prevalent because they exhibit external characteristics like “polish, charm, 
and cool decisiveness” that lead “organizations . . . [to] single[] [them] out 
for rapid promotion.”325F325 
Corporate psychopaths foster systemically destructive corporate 
behavior. Top management is one of the primary factors that determines 
whether corporations promote lawful or unlawful behavior. 326F326 The presence 
of “[c]orporate [p]sychopath[s] correlate[s] significantly and negatively with 
the construct of [corporate social responsibility].” 327F327 This means that 
corporations with psychopathic managers are less likely to engage in 
responsible business practices and philanthropic projects. Employees at 
organizations led by corporate psychopaths feel underappreciated and are 
less likely to agree that their employers operate in ways that are socially 
desirable, environmentally friendly, or beneficial to local communities. 328F328 
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Perhaps more surprisingly, studies show that corporate psychopaths are bad 
for business.329F329 “[U]ndiagnosed or misdiagnosed pathologies in our leaders 
are a precursor to ever escalating organizational dysfunction,” 330F330 which 
“adversely affect[s] productivity and ha[s] a negative impact 
on . . . organizational effectiveness.”331F331 Some business scholars argue that 
the negative effects of corporate psychopathy can reach beyond individual 
firms to undermine entire industries (such as finance). 332F332 
2. Corporate Psychopathy Not Eligible for the Defense 
It would be a significant strike against the corporate insanity defense if 
it seriously weakened the tools criminal law has to hold psychopathic 
corporations like Ford or PCA accountable. 333F333 That result would seem 
unavoidable if, as some scholars argue, psychopaths qualify for the insanity 
defense. For a variety of reasons, though, psychopathic corporations would 
be ineligible. 
Advocates for extending the insanity defense to individual psychopaths 
ground their arguments in science. Though psychopaths do not suffer from 
delusions334F334 and often appear rational,335F335 psychologists now know that 
psychopaths’ lack of emotional affect limits their normal reasoning. 336F336 
Psychopaths often make inconsistent statements and engage in contradictory 
thinking because their words are not “fused with the affective meaning” that 
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helps shape proper use.337F337 Psychopaths’ rational deficiencies extend beyond 
mere word use. Studies show that psychopaths are “not capable of rational 
choice . . . [because] the emotional and biological cues that normally guide 
individuals in the decision-making process are absent.”338F338 Psychopaths are 
particularly handicapped in ethical reasoning, 339F339 which requires an emotional 
capacity to respond to moral 340F340 or social stimuli341F341 that psychopaths lack. 
Consequently, some scholars argue, psychopaths cannot be morally 
responsible for their criminal behavior.342F342 
The argument for extending the insanity defense to psychopaths, 
whatever its merits, has yet to persuade lawmakers. 343F343 The drafters of the 
Model Penal Code purposely excluded psychopathy from their definition of 
insanity344F344 by making the defense unavailable for “an[y] abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.” 345F345 
Some psychologists agree with this approach because they think psychopathy 
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is “distinct from a psychosis that undermines . . . [the relevant] capacity to 
act rationally.”346F346 Perhaps equally salient for lawmakers is the pragmatic 
concern that “[i]f antisocial behavior were to constitute insanity, a substantial 
proportion of serious criminals would be able to assert . . . [the insanity] 
defense.”347F347 As the Supreme Court of California put it, “such an expansive 
role for the insanity defense would work more harm than good.” 348F348 
Above and beyond the psychological and pragmatic reasons against 
allowing individual psychopaths to raise the insanity defense, there are 
decisive legal reasons to exclude psychopathic corporations. Most for-profit 
corporations purposely orient themselves toward profit. This seeming 
tautology has important implications. As discussed above, the profit motive 
seems to be one significant explanation for psychopathic corporate behavior. 
However, mental diseases and defects that result from voluntary choices—
like taking intoxicants—usually do not qualify for the insanity defense. 349F349 
“To hold otherwise would allow . . . [a person] to steel his nerves, blanket his 
conscience, and fortify his resolve . . . in preparation for a criminal 
enterprise.”350F350 Analogously, corporations that organize themselves to 
prioritize profit over humanistic considerations should not be shielded when 
they succeed. The DSM takes a related position in defining psychopathy, 
which “must be distinguished from criminal behavior undertaken for gain 
that is not accompanied by . . . [other psychopathic] personality 
features . . . .”351F351 
Furthermore, if the profit motive is a significant contributor to corporate 
psychopathy, then all or most for-profit corporations will exhibit it. The 
insanity defense is only supposed to apply to relative rare diseases or defects 
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that represent deviations from the norm. 352F352 Near-universal traits—like 
corporate profiteering—cannot suffice.353F353 
Even though corporate psychopaths would not qualify for the corporate 
insanity defense, we may still wonder whether criminally punishing them is 
the best response. To be sure, psychopathic traits in criminal defendants seem 
to amplify our punitive impulses, even in white collar cases. 354F354 Yet, for 
individual psychopathic criminals, the data show that punishment and prison 
are ineffective criminal justice tools: they bring little deterrence or 
rehabilitation.355F355 The same is true of psychopathic corporate criminals. Some 
scholars believe that the corporate form’s economics effectively guarantees 
that corporations will always put shareholders and profits first.356F356 So, 
corporate psychopathy may be hardwired, leaving criminal law no way to 
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unwire it. Furthermore, some sociologists believe that psychopathic 
individuals will always find their way into senior corporate management. 
According to classical elite theory, human social structures guarantee that 
cunning and manipulative people will prosper in upper echelons. 357F357 
Though we should still punish criminal corporations, we should set 
aside any illusions that the criminal law can improve corporations with 
psychopathic tendencies. Criminal law can at least give us is the catharsis of 
striking back and provide us with the sense of justice done.358F358 
If we hope for change, we may need to reach outside of criminal law to 
mental health systems and corporate law. Since corporate psychopathy seems 
to be a systemic problem, it demands a systemic solution. More social 
attention to individual mental health problems among corporate managers 
would benefit the entire corporate hierarchy, including the managers 
themselves. Successful people are not immune to mental illness. The popular 
belief that white-collar crimes “are almost always . . . well-motivated and 
performed with an uncommonly clear head” is almost certainly wrong. 359F359 
The high incidence of personality disorder among upper corporate ranks 
belies perceptions that corporate managers are “largely ‘reasonable’ men and 
women” who need mental health treatment least. 360F360 While white-collar 
offenders may have “relatively easy access to psychiatric treatment,”361F361 
personality disorders can hide themselves from the people who suffer from 
them, making self-initiated treatment less likely. 362F362 We must continue to 
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criticize “dark leader attributes—lack of empathy, ruthless preoccupation 
with self-promotion, treacherous disloyalty to persons, groups and collective 
beliefs”363F363—but we should not stop at criticism. Recognizing that these 
attributes can be symptomatic of underlying psychological distress could be 
a step in the right direction. 
We should also resist the supposed legal and economic necessity of 
shareholder primacy in corporate law. Scholars have long proposed 
extending the law’s conception of corporate purpose to include more 
stakeholders.364F364 Corporations less fixated on profit and more attentive to 
social, labor, and environmental concerns would likely behave like the better-
rounded citizens we want them to be.365F365 There is cause for optimism on this 
front. The Corporate Business Roundtable, whose members include Jeff 
Bezos, Tim Cook,366F366 and many other CEOs from major U.S. corporations,367F367 
recently voted to redefine corporate purpose as promoting “an economy that 
serves all Americans.” 368F368 Although it is unclear what tangible effect this 
nonbinding vote will have,369F369 signatories have personally committed to 
valuing customer, employer, supplier, and community interests alongside 
shareholder value.370F370 
B. CORPORATE IRRATIONALITY AND IDENTITY DISORDERS 
The previous Section showed that the law’s understanding of corporate 
purpose pressures corporations to act like psychopaths. Even though 
psychopathic action ignores common-sense humanistic concerns, it is often 
hyper-rational from a practical perspective. This Section shows how the 
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law’s doctrines for understanding corporate behavior can destine 
corporations to behave in ways that lack even the pretense of rationality. 
1. The Law’s Role in Fostering Corporate Irrationality 
A simple noncorporate example will illustrate the basic problem. 
Suppose you are sitting alone on a park bench. An apartment window across 
the street slides open and catches your attention. The weather is crisp outside, 
but the air is fresh and invigorating. “Maybe the apartment was getting 
stuffy,” you think to yourself. A couple minutes later, you see the window 
slide closed. “Perhaps the air was a little too chill for whoever lives inside?” 
But no, some minutes later, the window opens again. Soon after, it closes. 
And then opens. And then closes. And opens. And so forth. After a half hour 
of this, you decide whoever lives there must be rather eccentric, and walk 
away not wanting to risk eye contact. 
While it may have been impossible to see from your vantage point, there 
is a simple explanation for the behavior you observed at the window. No 
“eccentric” lives in the apartment. If you looked through the window, you 
would learn that a couple, Jack and Jane Sprat, live there. They have opposite 
tastes in temperature. Jack prefers it cooler. Jane likes it warmer. He was 
opening the window; she was closing it. Though Jack and Jane were, as 
individuals, acting rationally in light of their preferences, “the couple,” as a 
unit, was behaving bizarrely. It makes no sense for anyone to repeatedly open 
and close a window. To diagnose and fix the problem, you would have to 
look through the window to see the individuals, their preferences, and the 
systems that connect (or divide) them. In healthy relationships, couples have 
interpersonal tools for solving such simple problems: a conversation, a 
compromise, and a half-open window. 
The law of corporate liability looks at the corporate window but not 
through it. Corporations are legal constructs, “existing only in contemplation 
of law.”371F371 The law gets to define what corporations are and what counts as 
corporate behavior.372F372 Federal law’s approach, and the approach adopted by 
most states,373F373 is set out in the doctrine of respondeat superior: “[A] 
corporation acts through its employees.” 374F374 All employee acts are 
simultaneously corporate acts so long as the employees take them “within the 
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scope of [their] employment [and] with the intent to benefit the 
corporation.”375F375 
Though the scope and intent requirements may seem like they could do 
significant work sifting true corporate acts from private employee acts, courts 
have weakened both limitations to near inconsequentiality. Respondeat 
superior applies even when an employee acts contrary to her employer’s 
orders376F376 and with an intent to benefit her employer in only a subsidiary, 377F377 
hypothetical,378F378 or ineffective379F379 way. 
[T]he employer may be entirely blameless, may have exercised the utmost human 
foresight to safeguard the employee; yet, if the alter ego, while acting within the scope 
of his duties, be negligent—in disobedience, it may be, of the employer’s positive and 
specific command—the employer is answerable for the consequences.380F380 
Courts have rebuffed nearly every request to peer through the corporate 
window to look at individual employees, systems, and incentives before 
deciding whether to hold corporations liable for employee misconduct. 
Corporate behavior just is employee behavior—all of it.381F381 
Economists and psychologists who study groups know that rational 
action from individuals can lead to patently irrational group behavior. 
Collective action problems like the tragedy of the commons are one familiar 
example.382F382 Individuals using a common resource (e.g., a pasture) may each 
make rational self-interested decisions about how to use the resource (e.g., 
each puts more of his own sheep in the pasture) but thereby soon “brings ruin 
to all” (e.g., the pasture becomes overgrazed and unusable).383F383 The rational 
course for the group would have been to use the resource sustainably. 
Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem is another example of 
individual rationality leading to group irrationality. 384F384 Arrow proved that 
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collectives that use voting to aggregate individual preferences (say, by 
majority vote) will end up setting bizarre courses of action, 385F385 even if 
everyone’s individual preferences are sensible. 386F386 For example, suppose 
there are three possible projects (A, B, and C) that the group could pursue 
and each individual votes on which project to pursue before the other 
projects. Even if everyone votes rationally in accordance with their 
preference about project order, the results may dictate that B should start 
before A, C should start before B, and (impossibly) A should start before 
C.387F387 
The tragedy of the commons and the impossibility theorem are not 
difficult to explain. They are also relatively easy to mitigate once understood. 
Privatizing communal property helps each person internalize the full costs of 
its use.388F388 Different voting procedures can reduce the chance of reaching 
paradoxical results.389F389 To appreciate the source of the problem and the 
solutions available, one must take advantage of two perspectives, 
simultaneously seeing the collective and the individuals composing it—the 
forest and the trees. 
Better internal corporate procedures cannot fix all the self-undermining 
irrationality that corporate law currently attributes to corporations. 
According to respondeat superior, each and every corporate employee 
simultaneously instantiates the entirety of their employer’s capacity to act. 
Arrow’s collectives at least have mechanisms for aggregating individual 
preferences into unified group preferences. Corporate law, however, refuses 
to aggregate individual employee behavior into unified corporate behavior. 
From the law’s perspective, a corporation always takes every action that any 
of its employees takes. This makes for a very strange picture of the sort of 
“people” corporations are. If two employees argue, the corporation adopts 
both sides of the argument. If two employees fight, the corporation at once 
throws and receives all the punches. 
 
 385 Id. at 343 (“[T]he doctrine of voters’ sovereignty is incompatible with that of collective 
rationality.”). 
 386 Id. at 334 (“[I]t will be assumed that individuals are rational . . . .”). 
 387 Id. at 329. 
 388 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 
(1967) (“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater 
internalization of externalities.”). 
 389 DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 
441–76 (1992); Nathan Collins, Arrow’s Theorem Proves No Voting System Is Perfect, TECH, 
(Feb. 28, 2003), http://tech.mit.edu/V123/N8/8voting.8n.html [https://perma.cc/49JN-DABT] 
(“The practical question for policy makers and voters is which system manages to run in to its 
problems least often.”). 
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Of more practical concern, where different employees have inconsistent 
understandings of corporate objectives or have conflicting individual goals, 
respondeat superior says the corporation simultaneously pursues them all. 
For example, one employee in a hiring department might make hiring 
decisions on purely objective criteria, another might give undue preference 
to men, a third might give undue preference to women, and a fourth might be 
running compliance to make sure all hiring practices are legal. According to 
the way the law defines corporate behavior, this corporation, at one and the 
same time, hires in a nondiscriminatory way, engages in gender 
discrimination (both in favor of and against women), and tries to prevent 
discrimination. 
According to respondeat superior, corporations literally have multiple 
identities and act on them all. In any natural person, such patterns of behavior 
could be symptomatic of a disruptive psychological condition called 
“dissociative identity disorder” (“DID,” formerly “multiple personality 
disorder”). “[DID] is a rare condition in which two or more distinct identities, 
or personality states, are present in—and alternately take control of—an 
individual.”390F390 The DSM-V diagnostic criteria for DID include 
“discontinuity in . . . sense of agency, accompanied by related alterations 
in . . . behavior . . . ” that “impair[] social, occupational, or other important 
areas of functioning . . . .”391F391 While DID may be rare among natural people, 
respondeat superior effectively prescribes it for all corporate people. 
Even focusing on single personalities, the law necessitates that 
corporations will behave in irrational and self-destructive ways. The source 
of the problem is an unavoidable feature of any agent–principal relationship: 
agency costs.392F392 Employees have a “natural incentive to advance their 
personal interests even when those interests conflict with the goal of 
maximizing firm value.”393F393 Since employers can never perfectly monitor 
their employees, employees can act opportunistically at their employers’ 
 
 390 Dissociative Identity Disorder, PSYCH. TODAY (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/conditions/dissociative-identity-disorder-multiple-
personality-disorder [https://perma.cc/FBZ4-BVWU]. 
 391 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 226, at 292. 
 392 Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-
Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 188 (1997) (“[C]orporate 
law’s most important and difficult challenge is to reduce agency cost. . . . 
The inevitable conflict between the rational economic interests of the agent and those of the 
principal produces an unavoidable loss of wealth, as compared to an unrealistic realm in which 
agents actually ignored their own interests.”). 
 393 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law 
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 775 (2017). 
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expense.394F394 This opportunism may manifest itself in relatively mundane 
ways, like shirking on the job or using the office printer to make garage-sale 
signs. It can also show itself in criminal conduct that is far from mundane, 
like boosting sales numbers through fraudulent bookkeeping or trimming 
costs by dumping pollutants illegally. Such activities secure private benefits 
for the employees who carry them out (e.g., performance bonuses, bolstered 
reputation, promotion, etc.), often with little real risk of getting caught. The 
corporate form can obfuscate employees’ identity and shield them from 
detection.395F395 
Since respondeat superior ignores these agency costs, it forces the law 
to see corporations as behaving in irrational and self-destructive ways. The 
consequences for corporations can be devastating. For one thing, the 
expected costs of employee crime to the corporation usually outweighs any 
benefit the corporation may incidentally derive. Studies show that corporate 
crime generally decreases overall corporate value. 396F396 And decades of 
experience show that corporations are much easier targets for prosecution 
than employees.397F397 Sometimes corporations do not even have to wait for a 
criminal charge to experience the costs of employee crime. As in Sun 
Diamond (discussed in the Introduction), the corporation itself may be the 
victim. Employees can enrich themselves by illegally filching corporate 
money or making illicit use of corporate information. Since the crimes of 
corporate agents (i.e., employees) are the crimes of the corporate principal 
 
 394 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 212, at 327–28. 
 395 See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bringing 
Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-
corps.PDF [https://perma.cc/7GUW-V43K]. 
 396 Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? 
Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 22 (1999). 
 397 James B. Stewart, In Corporate Crimes, Individual Accountability Is Elusive, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/business/in-corporate-crimes-
individual-accountability-is-elusive.html [https://perma.cc/5SLP-2F5K] (“Professor 
[Brandon L.] Garrett analyzed 303 nonprosecution and deferred prosecution agreements with 
corporations from 2001 to 2014 in which companies avoided guilty pleas by paying fines and 
agreeing to other measures . . . . [and] found that individuals were charged in only 34 percent 
of the cases.” After Professor Garrett asked prosecutors why this is the case, he reported that 
“[s]ome say they don’t have the resources. It’s one thing to settle with a big company and 
another thing to do serious investigations of dozens of people. Others say these aren’t really 
intentional crimes, or it’s difficult to establish intent in individual cases. Others just repeat the 
party line, which is, ‘We target individuals whenever we have the evidence.’ All of those are 
probably true to some extent.”). 
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(i.e., the employer),398F398 the law sees corporations as committing crimes that, 
contrary to all reason, only hurt themselves. 399F399 
2. Mere Corporate Identity Disorders Not Eligible 
Mere corporate irrationality of the sort just described, even when 
analogizable to real psychological conditions like dissociative identity 
disorder, would not qualify for the insanity defense. This may sound 
surprising, given that courts often recognize that people who suffer from DID 
can be candidates for the insanity defense.400F400 
Where multiple personalities are concerned, an interesting question 
arises as to which personality is tried. Assume, for example, that an accused 
has a dual personality. His usual personality is conforming and conventional. 
During a dissociative episode, the accused switches to his alter personality 
and commits a murder. At the time of trial, the accused is in his conventional 
personality. Is it fair to try the conventional personality? Is it even 
constitutional?401F401 If a defendant suffering from DID engaged in criminal 
conduct during a dissociative episode, the conventional personality 
necessarily lacked control over the crime. 402F402 This would seem to be a 
straightforward argument for the insanity defense under the volitional test. 
There are two reasons why the corporate insanity defense would not 
extend to corporate identity disorders. Though DID only affects 1.5% of the 
 
 398 See Benjamin Thompson & Andrew Yong, Corporate Criminal Liability, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 489, 491–92 (2012) (“A corporation has no physical existence and can be held 
vicariously criminally liable for the acts, omissions, or failures of employees acting as 
agents.”). 
 399 Economists have shown that, as a general rule, corporate crime has a negative long-
term effect on firm value. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 67, at 22. 
 400 State v. Lockhart, 542 S.E.2d 443, 446 (W. Va. 2000) (“[E]xpert testimony regarding 
Dissociative Identity Disorder may be admissible in connection with a defendant’s assertion 
of an insanity defense.”); United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1013–14 (10th Cir. 
1993); Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, 
1 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 534, 596–97 (1995) (“[D]issociative identity disorder 
. . . in appropriate cases ha[s] been accepted as [a] predicate[] for an insanity defense.”). But 
see State v. Greene, 984 P.2d 1024, 1032 (Wash. 1999) (“[I]t was not possible to reliably 
connect the symptoms of DID to the sanity or mental capacity of the defendant.”). Indeed, 
fifty-five percent of criminal defendants with DID enter an insanity plea. See Sabra M. Owens, 
Criminal Responsibility and Multiple Personality Defendants, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 133, 140–43 (1997). 
 401 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615, supra note 80, § 14. 
 402 Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d at 1014 (“We are convinced that the trial court’s interpretation 
of [the insanity defense statute and its application to a person suffering from multiple 
personality disorder] is unreasonable in restricting the focus of the court and jury narrowly to 
the alter or alters cognizant of the offense, and ignoring proof that the dominant or host 
personality was not aware of the wrongful conduct.”). 
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general population,403F403 among corporations it is a near universal phenomenon. 
Recall, these disorders for corporations arise because respondeat superior 
treats corporations as though they act through all of their employees all of 
the time. If two employees pursue conflicting conceptions of the corporate 
good, the corporation simultaneously pursues them both. As a consequence, 
most corporations necessarily have multiple personalities that are acting on 
their behalf. The insanity defense, however, can only apply to relatively rare 
conditions. 
Additionally, the law has developed a way to use prosecutorial 
discretion as a solution to corporate identity problems in criminal law.404F404 
When it comes time to charge a corporation, prosecutors can identify one 
employee to stand in for the entire corporation. 405F405 Prosecutors then show that 
that employee, while acting on behalf of the corporation, committed a crime. 
As the courtroom narrative unfolds, the corporation effectively comes to 
have just a single personality linking its past misconduct and its present 
defense. 
Allowing prosecutors to pick an employee to represent the entire 
corporation has controversial criminal justice implications. It is not clear that 
every employee is an equally plausible stand-in for the entire corporation. 
Although many find it intuitive that upper-level management are good 
proxies for corporations, those intuitions become strained as prosecutors 
move down the corporate hierarchy.406F406 Singling out just one representative 
of the corporation also sidelines what other corporate employees were doing 
at the time of the crime. That may be relevant if, for example, they were 
 
 403 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 226, at 294. 
 404 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL §§ 9-28.210 (2018), 9-28.1300 (2015), 9-
28.1400 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-
business-organizations [https://perma.cc/4VRW-VLN4]; Memorandum from Mark Filip, 
Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2
008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf (“In making a decision to charge a corporation, the 
prosecutor generally has substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even 
whether to prosecute for violations of federal criminal law.”) [https://perma.cc/W7TF-ESDQ]. 
 405 See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 
1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (upholding conviction of corporation for bribes paid by 
single employee). 
 406 See Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model 
Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 40–41 (1957) 
(“[High managerial agents] are the mens, the mind or brain, of the corporation.”); see also 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 explanatory note (AM. L. INST. 2019). 
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engaged in efforts to prevent the sort of misconduct at issue. 407F407 One might 
have thought that the concerted action of many employees would be more 
reflective of the corporation than the deviant action of just one. But the 
prosecutor need not consider this. 408F408 Whatever the criminal justice 
implications of letting prosecutors pick a corporate personality for trial, that 
approach at least fixes the conceptual challenges posed by corporate DID—
the corporate identity at the time of the trial becomes the same as its identity 
at the time of commission. 
V. THE DEFENSE IN PRACTICE 
Just as the test for the insanity defense varies by jurisdiction, 409F409 so does 
its procedure. Long-settled Supreme Court precedent protects states’ 
decisions about how to implement the defense. 410F410 It is a doctrine that has 
“historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the 
tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing 
religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This 
process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the 
States.”411F411 
Procedure determines not just how the defense operates in practice, but 
what its criminal justice significance is. Shifting burdens of production and 
proof shape who can assert the defense and how likely they are to succeed. 
Any evaluation of the insanity defense would be incomplete without 
considering the procedural consequences of successfully asserting it. In 
contrast to most criminal law defenses, the insanity defense ordinarily does 
not entail releasing acquittees to the general population. Routine release 
would undermine many of the goals of the insanity defense, like protecting 
 
 407 Bharara, supra note 237, at 65 (“[A] multinational corporation may theoretically be 
indicted, convicted, and perhaps put out of business based on the alleged criminal activity of 
a single, low-level, rogue employee who was acting without the knowledge of any executive 
or director, in violation of well-publicized procedures, practices, and instructions of the 
company.”). 
 408 See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(upholding conviction of corporation for crime of single employee who acted against 
corporate policies). 
 409 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 737 (2006) (“[T]he insanity rule . . . is substantially 
open to state choice.”). 
 410 See generally Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897) (holding that the procedure by 
which insanity is assessed is a matter of state legislation); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 
(1950) (upholding Georgia’s recognition of its governor’s competency to assess insanity); 
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958) (upholding California procedure which denies 
prisoners any right to initiate their own insanity determination). 
 411 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968). 
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the public and the defendant from his condition. Most insanity acquittees 
should be, and are, diverted to mental health facilities for a period of time. 412F412 
This Part focuses on significant procedural decision points for 
implementing the corporate insanity defense. Advocates of the individual 
insanity defense often argue that modifying procedure can disarm critics’ 
concerns.413F413 For corporate defendants too, sensible procedure can go a long 
way toward addressing potential worries. Procedure can, as necessary, 
ratchet down the defense’s availability and ratchet up its consequences. 
An added nuance could be layered over the procedural 
recommendations that follow. The discussion assumes that each jurisdiction 
would apply its own, uniform procedure for all corporate defendants 
claiming the insanity defense. Other models are available. The American Bar 
Association, for example, recommends a two-tiered approach to the insanity 
defense: one tier for defendants acquitted of violent felonies and another for 
all other acquittees.414F414 Federal law also partially uses a two-tiered system.415F415 
Some scholars propose a third tier specifically for homicide cases. 416F416 In that 
third tier, the insanity defense could be prohibited or limited in various 
ways.417F417 Something similar may be appropriate for corporate defendants—
limiting the availability of the defense or amplifying the consequences of 
asserting it for certain categories of corporate crime, e.g., those that cause 
physical injury or significant market harms. Current corporate sentencing law 
already singles out such crimes for distinctive treatment. 418F418 Corporations that 
 
 412 LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1. 
 413 R. Michael Shoptaw, M’Naghten is a Fundamental Right: Why Abolishing the 
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 416 Wexler, supra note 55, at 555–57. 
 417 Id. at 550. 
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conceal crime after it has occurred could also face more stringent standards 
and consequences, perhaps even disqualification from the insanity 
defense.419F419 
A. TREATMENT AFTER ACQUITTAL 
One obvious worry is that the insanity defense would let corporations 
off the hook, freeing them to injure new victims with impunity and 
emboldening future corporate criminals. That result would be a disqualifying 
strike against the defense. However, the worry turns on a mistake about how 
the insanity defense works. “An acquittal by reason of insanity is rarely a 
ticket to freedom.”420F420 For some scholars, this feature of the insanity defense 
warrants its abolition.421F421 As to the corporate insanity defense, mandatory 
evaluation and treatment of acquittees is a critical safeguard. 
Applying the insanity defense puts the criminal justice system in an 
awkward position. By acquitting the defendant, the court necessarily finds 
that he is not criminally or morally responsible for his misconduct. Yet the 
court must also find that the defendant had a disorder that led to criminal 
behavior. Releasing him could expose the public to a known source of 
criminal harm and leave the acquittee without needed treatment. 
The law adopts a sensible solution: committing the acquittee to a mental 
health facility for a period of time. “Like defense of self, the defense of 
insanity, if successfully pleaded, results in ‘acquittal.’ But unlike the 
acquittal of self-defense which means liberty, the acquittal of the insanity 
defense means deprivation of liberty for an indefinite term in a ‘mental 
institution.’”422F422 Often, defendants who successfully raise the insanity 
defense spend more time under treatment, segregated from the general 
 
 419 ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173(i) 
(“Concealing one’s identity, fleeing a crime scene, hiding evidence, resisting arrest, and 
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public, than they would have spent in prison if convicted.423F423 As one Supreme 
Court Justice has summarized the law, “[i]f a defendant establishes an 
insanity defense, he is not criminally liable, though the government may 
confine him civilly for as long as he continues to pose a danger to himself or 
to others by reason of his mental illness.”424F424 
Treatment for corporations necessarily looks different than it does for 
individuals, but it is nothing new. Organizational scientists and economists 
have identified many potential causes of corporate insanity. 425F425 As above, I 
continue to focus on the role of defective corporate culture and agency costs. 
There are well-established strategies for addressing both. “Tone at the top” 
seems to be one of the most crucial influence on corporate culture. 426F426 Upper 
management sets the example and shapes the norms by which the rest of the 
corporation operates.427F427 It stands to reason that replacing managers whose 
personalities and management style foster a criminogenic workplace 
environment can help. That is why hiring new management is one of the first 
responses many corporations take when they discover prevalent internal 
misconduct.428F428 However, sometimes internal dynamics can prevent a 
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corporation from replacing management—the managers who need replacing 
may be entrenched or may themselves be responsible for making personnel 
decisions.429F429 In such cases, compulsion by an external hand may be 
necessary for meaningful change. 
Implementing better compliance programs can be an effective course of 
treatment for mitigating destructive agency costs. By definition, compliance 
programs seek to prevent misconduct. 430F430 They involve “promulgation of 
codes of behavior, the institution of training programs, the identification of 
internal compliance personnel and the creation of procedures and controls to 
insure company-wide compliance with legal mandates.” 431F431 Compliance 
programs can keep employees in check with operating procedures designed 
to prevent, detect, and sanction criminal conduct. 432F432 Once misconduct 
occurs, an effective compliance program updates itself to reduce the chance 
of it happening again.433F433 As big data, automation, and artificial intelligence 
come to play a larger role in compliance science, many agency costs will 
become easier and cheaper to mitigate. 434F434 
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If corporate insanity can be treated along the lines just described, the 
law must say who is to administer the treatment. Judges already occasionally 
mandate some kinds of corporate treatment after conviction. 435F435 The 
Sentencing Guidelines give judges broad discretion to design terms of 
probation that can include implementing new compliance programs and 
replacing personnel.436F436 Prosecutors also frequently do something similar 
before, and in lieu of, trial. Many DOJ investigations into corporate 
misconduct end with deferred or nonprosecution agreements (“DPA” and 
“NPA”), which avert trial in exchange for the corporations’ agreements to 
pay fines and improve compliance.437F437 
Unfortunately, neither judges nor prosecutors are well-suited to the task 
of treating defective corporations. Both lack the necessary expertise. 438F438 
Compliance, corporate governance, and management are sophisticated 
sciences.439F439 They are not a part of the training regimen for judges and 
prosecutors. Federal prosecutors are perhaps the biggest offenders, both in 
terms of the significance of the cases they try to resolve through pretrial 
diversion and the hubris they display.440F440 Of prosecutorial compliance efforts, 
the Government Accountability Office tells us that the “DOJ cannot evaluate 
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(imposing probation on corporate convict and requiring compliance reform); see also 
Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate 
Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 12–26 (1988) (discussing the 
emergence of corporate probation in federal law). 
 436 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018). 
 437 See Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 67, at 93 (“Criminal [deferred prosecution 
agreements] now routinely require firms to reorganize business operations, adopt compliance 
measures, submit to enhanced monitoring for legal violations, and create systems to encourage 
and protect whistle-blowers.”). 
 438 See Baer, supra note 430, at 953 (“Despite the fact that the DOJ has intoned an interest 
in generating a more ethical ‘corporate culture,’ its prosecutors have little expertise in bringing 
about this development . . . .”); Diamantis, supra note 43, at 563–65. 
 439 See generally Shann Turnbull, The Science of Corporate Governance, 10 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE 261 (2002) (discussing technologically sophisticated analysis of some 
approaches to corporate governance). Many graduate schools offer advanced degrees in fields 
such as corporate compliance and management. Launching a Career in Compliance 
Consulting: 3 Frequently Asked Questions, ROBERT HALF (June 10, 2015, 6:00 PM) 
https://www.roberthalf.com/blog/job-market/launching-a-career-in-compliance-consulting-
3-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/CA7X-PTYK]; MBA Programs and 
Specialties, U.S. NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-business-schools 
[https://perma.cc/DC59-3TQL] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020). 
 440 I have previously argued that judges are institutionally better situated to make 
decisions about compliance reforms for corporate criminals. See Diamantis, supra note 43, at 
559–62. 
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and demonstrate the extent to which DPAs and NPAs . . . contribute to the 
department’s efforts to combat corporate crime because it has no measures 
to assess their effectiveness.”441F441 
The thought of turning treatment decisions over to judges or prosecutors 
would strike us as absurd where individual mental health is concerned. It is 
no less absurd here. As for individuals, corporate insanity acquittees should 
receive expert treatment. There is no shortage of experts, including state of 
the art compliance consulting firms.442F442 Private, for-profit services to treat 
corporate criminals may raise concerns about objectivity. Many states have 
government-run facilities for housing and treating criminally insane 
individuals.443F443 One commentator has suggested that states should go further 
and create mental-health sentencing boards to “determine both the 
appropriate sentencing scheme and treatment of each offender that is found 
[not guilty by reason of insanity], as well as monitor the offender’s 
treatment.”444F444 Both government-run treatment options and expert sentencing 
boards would be suitable for implementing the corporate insanity defense. 
These would necessarily entail expenses for an already resource-stretched 
criminal justice system. Though individual insanity acquittees at state 
 
 441 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 10-110, DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER 
TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE 
EFFECTIVENESS 20–24 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10110.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CP8F-J496]. 
 442 Such consulting firms include: ACCENTURE, https://www.accenture.com/us-
en/services/business-process-services/compliance-as-a-service [https://perma.cc/U5LR-
MLQ2] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZP34-MC7P] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); DUFF & PHELPS, 
https://www.duffandphelps.com/services/compliance-and-regulatory-consulting 
[https://perma.cc/7JFX-4L7L] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); FTI CONSULTING, 
https://www.fticonsulting.com/industries/public-sector/government-contracts/compliance-
and-regulatory-solutions (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); POLARIS GROUP, https://www.polaris-
group.com/services_compliance1.asp?page=compliance1 [https://perma.cc/Q5QZ-D3VK] 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2020); SPARK COMPLIANCE CONSULTING, http://www.sparkcomplian
ce.com/ [https://perma.cc/NAE2-T5AD] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020). 
 443 See AMANDA WIK, VERA HOLLEN & WILLIAM H. FISHER, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE 
MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., FORENSIC PATIENTS IN STATE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS: 
1999-2016 103 (2017), https://www.nasmhpd.org/sites/default/files/TACPaper.10.Forensic-
Patients-in-State-Hospitals_508C_v2.pdf (providing data regarding census of “not guilty by 
reason of insanity” patients per state) [https://perma.cc/E2CZ-2YMC]; New York State Office 
of Mental Health Division of Forensic Services, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/forensic/bfs.htm; Oregon State Hospital, OR. HEALTH 
AUTH., https://www.oregon.gov/oha/OSH/Pages/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/BX88-3ZFA]. 
 444 Julie E. Grachek, Comment, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How 
Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 
1497 (2006). 
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hospitals sometimes receive free treatment, 445F445 the present trend in corporate 
criminal justice is to have corporations foot the bill for their own compliance 
reforms.446F446 
Just as the law needs a different sort of expert to treat corporations, it 
needs a different method for delivering treatment. For individuals, the 
process is relatively straightforward. The state commits individuals to mental 
health facilities, which serve a double purpose: They isolate potentially 
dangerous acquittees from the general public and also provide a forum where 
doctors can directly deliver treatment. The State cannot commit corporations 
to a place of treatment. They have no bodies to lock away. 447F447 Even if it were 
possible, segregating corporations from the public—their customers, 
investors, creditors, etc.—would inevitably kill them, a self-defeating result 
from a treatment perspective.448F448 
There are methods short of confinement to incapacitate criminal 
corporations in ways that protect the public and make treatment possible. 
They vary in the extent of the limitations they impose. On the more 
permissive end, I have extensively discussed one approach which prosecutors 
and judges currently use in their efforts to rehabilitate: hiring corporate 
monitors who are experts in corporate reform. 449F449 A monitor would oversee 
internal compliance improvements while allowing the corporation to 
continue operating as a business. The powers granted to corporate monitors 
 
 445 C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Constitutionality of Statute Imposing Liability upon Estate 
or Relatives of Insane Person for His Support in Asylum, 20 A.L.R. 3d 363 § 2 (1968) (“It is 
generally settled that the care and custody of insane . . . persons is vested in the state; the state, 
under the traditional doctrine of parens patriae, controls, treats, and maintains the insane, both 
for their protection and the protection of others . . . . [However,] [i]n a number of jurisdictions, 
statutes have been enacted making the property of a[n] [inmate], or his relatives, liable for the 
inmate’s maintenance and support while confined in a state asylum.”). 
 446 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4(b)(5) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018) (“Compensation to and costs of any experts engaged by the court shall be paid by the 
organization.”). 
 447 See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981); JEREMY 
BENTHAM, PANOPTICON VERSUS NEW SOUTH WALES; OR THE PANOPTICON PENITENTIARY 
SYSTEM, AND THE PENAL COLONIZATION SYSTEM, COMPARED 27 (1812) (describing 
incapacitation as a “body operating upon a body”). 
 448 See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 271, 277–79 (2008); Thomas, supra note 196, at 955 (“To reiterate, de jure suspension 
means de facto death. No business can wait around for five years without operating; employees 
will leave and third parties and customers will take their business elsewhere.”). 
 449 See generally Mihailis E. Diamantis, Monitorships: An Academic Perspective, in 
GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW: THE GUIDE TO MONITORSHIPS (Anthony S. Barkow, Neil 
M. Barofsky & Thomas J. Perrelli eds., 2019) (discussing the use of monitors to reform 
corporate criminals). 
2021] THE CORPORATE INSANITY DEFENSE 71 
can be tailored to specific cases but typically include at least access to 
necessary information, the authority to design compliance protocols, and the 
means to ensure their implementation.450F450 
An intermediate to incapacitating corporations is also available: 
suspending their privilege to conduct certain forms of business. 451F451 Many 
industries require special licenses (e.g., to provide accounting services for 
publicly traded companies)452F452 or authorization (e.g., to file for Medicare 
reimbursements).453F453 Reinstatement of such licenses and authorizations could 
be conditioned on successful treatment. Where public protection and 
treatment demand a more intrusive approach, one scholar describes a system 
of “robust receivership, or even temporary nationalization” that might be up 
to the task.454F454 
 
B. THE ROLE OF THE JURY 
The previous Section’s emphasis on the importance of expertise for 
treating insane corporations may prompt concern about the role of jurors. 
When a defendant raises the insanity defense, it is the jury that decides 
whether it applies.455F455 Yet lay jurors typically lack the background in 
organizational science needed to evaluate a corporate defendant’s internal 
culture or compliance systems.456F456 
This sort of concern does not arise only for corporate defendants. Lay 
jurors are just as inexpert about the medical sciences as they are about 
organizational science. Of course, jurors are more familiar with applying the 
psychological concepts of insanity to individuals than they are to 
corporations. This casual use, though, makes things worse. Familiarity may 
lend a sense of confidence, but it does not entail understanding. Often, jurors 
 
 450 See Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. REG. 109, 127–30 (2016); 
Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate 
Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1724 (2007). 
 451 See GARRETT, supra note 217, at 67–68 (detailing KPMG’s 2005 DPA and how the 
DOJ chose to take no action regarding KPMG’s auditing privileges, though the government 
could have suspended or debarred the firm). 
 452 E.g., 15 U.S.C. 7212(a) (accounting license to service publicly traded companies); 15 
U.S.C. § 78 (broker-dealer license to trade stock of publicly owned companies). 
 453 E.g., 42 C.F.R. § 424.510 (authorized Medicare provider). 
 454 Thomas, supra note 196, at 955. 
 455 Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 11 (2006) (“‘[T]he fact of sanity, as any other 
essential fact in the case, must be established to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’”) (quoting Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897)). 
 456 See Valerie P. Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 182–90 (1989). 
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attempting to apply medical concepts look for an “insane defendant [who] 
resembles a crazy caricature” disconnected from actual medical 
categories.457F457 
Some scholars argue for a more scientific approach to the insanity 
defense.458F458 If “the legal insanity defense [were] rooted in medicine,” jurors 
would be less inclined to rely on background intuitions about what insanity 
is and looks like.459F459 In the corporate context, where the stakes for the public 
are higher and the number of stakeholders affected by the disposition at trial 
is greater, the argument for injecting more science into the process could be 
even stronger. Regardless of whether scholars make any progress on this 
front for individual defendants, courts could adopt a different process for 
corporations. One way to do this could be to modify the rules of evidence 
concerning expert testimony. Currently, expert insanity witnesses testifying 
in federal court cannot opine on the ultimate issue of whether the defendant 
was actually insane.460F460 Removing this restriction in corporate cases would 
give experts more influence in the courtroom. 
There are a number of reasons that it is probably preferable to preserve 
a strong role for lay juries in applying the corporate insanity defense. 
Although insanity might be a scientific concept outside of the law, within the 
courtroom it is ultimately a moral concept. “Courts have traditionally 
stressed the distinction between mental disease as a ‘legal’ concept and 
mental disease as a ‘medical’ concept.”461F461 Some courts are quite blunt on the 
matter: “[L]egal insanity has a different meaning and a different purpose than 
the concept of medical insanity.” 462F462 The American Medical Association 
agrees: 
A defense premised on psychiatric models represents a singularly unsatisfactory, and 
inherently contradictory approach to the issue of accountability . . . . The essential goal 
of an exculpatory test for insanity is to identify the point at which a defendant’s mental 
condition has become so impaired that society may confidently conclude that he has 
lost his free will . . . . [F]ree will is an article of faith, rather than a concept that can be 
 
 457 Laufer, supra note 97, at 454. 
 458 See Reider, supra note 336, at 291 (“[O]ur current tests for insanity would benefit from 
an exploration of the scientific world.”). 
 459 Beatrice R. Maidman, Note, The Legal Insanity Defense: Transforming the Legal 
Theory into a Medical Standard, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1831, 1834 (2016). 
 460 FED. R. EVID. 704(b). 
 461 Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 352, at 344. 
 462 State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 491 (Wash. 1983); see also State v. Singleton, 48 
A.3d 285, 294 (N.J. 2012) (“The insanity defense exists in criminal law not to identify the 
mentally ill, but rather to determine who among the mentally ill should be held criminally 
responsible for their conduct.”). 
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explained in medical terms . . . . Accordingly, since models of mental illness are 
indeterminant in this respect, they can provide no reliable measure of responsibility. 463F463 
The decision for the jury to make is not whether the defendant has a mental 
illness (scientific concept), but whether the mental illness he has negates 
responsibility (moral concept). The latter is precisely the sort of judgment 
that lay juries are competent to make.464F464 
The fundamentally moral nature of the insanity defense does not mean 
that experts have no role to play. Expert testimony gives the jury insight into 
the psychological facts needed to make a decision. “Ideally, psychiatrists—
much like experts in other fields—should provide grist for the legal mill, 
should furnish the raw data upon which the legal judgment is based. It is the 
psychiatrist who informs as to the mental state of the accused—his 
characteristics, his potentialities, his capabilities.” 465F465 
Especially in the corporate context, compliance and organizational 
expert witnesses would aid the jury in evaluating a defendant’s 
responsibility, but they probably should not testify to the ultimate issue of 
insanity. By limiting psychiatric expert testimony, Congress sought “to 
eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to 
directly contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found 
by the trier of fact.” 466F466 The legislation was backed by the American 
Psychiatric Association.467F467 
The concern about experts capturing insanity determinations is even 
more pressing in the corporate context. Less familiar with how large 
organizations operate, jurors may relinquish control to expert opinion rather 
 
 463 Board of Trustees, Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials and Limitations of Psychiatric 
Testimony, 251 JAMA 2967, 2978 (1984); see also SHUMAN, supra note 125, § 12:3 (“The 
role played by psychiatric and psychological testimony in the insanity defense is further 
complicated by many conceptual differences between law and the behavioral sciences of 
psychiatry and psychology. The criminal law rests on the assumption that free will exists and 
that it is therefore generally legally and morally appropriate to punish violations of the 
criminal laws. Psychiatry and psychology focus on various biochemical, genetic, organic, 
behavioral, and psychological explanations for behavior.”) (citation omitted). 
 464 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620 (2d Cir. 1966) (“[I]t is society as a whole, 
represented by judge or jury, which decides whether a man . . . should or should not be held 
accountable for his acts.”) 
 465 Id. at 619–20. 
 466 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 230 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412. 
 467 Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the 
Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 686 (1983). But see Anne Lawson Braswell, 
Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and the Insanity 
Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620, 631, 635 (1987) (disagreeing with FRE 704(b) because 
“juries may reject any expert’s opinion” and the rule “deprive[s] jurors of information 
necessary to make that testimony helpful”). 
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than relying on their personal moral perspective.468F468 Expert information about 
a corporate defendant’s organizational “disease or defect and [a] descri[ption 
of] the characteristics and effects of the disease or defect” would aid 
jurors.469F469 Where large dollar values are at stake (as is often the case with 
corporate trials), deference to compliance experts (some of whom will be 
highly compensated and motivated defense witnesses) on ultimate issues 
should give us pause. 
For readers concerned about potential overuse of the corporate insanity 
defense, there is additional appeal to leaving ultimate control with juries. 
Successful assertion of the insanity defense is rare among individual criminal 
defendants.470F470 Available evidence comparing jury sympathy toward 
similarly-situated corporate and individual defendants consistently reveals 
bias against the former.471F471 Keeping the defense firmly in the hands of juries 
could be an effective means of ensuring that the standards for asserting the 
corporate insanity defense remain high. 
C. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS 
Evidentiary standards govern access to the insanity defense and how the 
defense operates. Proof is needed at three separate stages: trial, when the jury 
decides whether to grant or deny the defense; post-trial, when the judge 
decides whether to commit the acquittee to a treatment facility; and release, 
when some official determines whether and under what terms the acquittee 
may leave the treatment facility. Jurisdictions vary widely in the standards 
and burdens they apply at each of these stages. Regardless of how 
jurisdictions approach evidence for individual insanity claimants, they may 
prefer a different, perhaps more demanding, arrangement for corporate 
claimants. This Section proposes some best practices. 
 
 468 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 740 (2006) (“[T]here is the potential of mental-disease 
evidence to mislead jurors (when they are the factfinders) through the power of this kind of 
evidence to suggest that a defendant suffering from a recognized mental disease lacks 
cognitive, moral, volitional, or other capacity, when that may not be a sound conclusion at 
all.”). But see Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 352, at 346 (“Even when the law insists that 
they express themselves in mechanistic terms, decisionmakers are likely to think and judge in 
evaluative ones.”). 
 469 ARTHUR & HUNTER, supra note 160, § 12:18; United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574, 
1576 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Morse, supra note 27, at 823 (“Experts should be limited to 
offering both full, rich, clinical descriptions of thoughts, feelings, and actions and relevant 
data based on sound scientific studies.”). 
 470 PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 113, § 3:11 
(“Since the Hinckley case and the subsequent narrowing of the insanity defense, few serious 
crimes result in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.”). 
 471 See Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An 
Examination of the “Deep-Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 L. & SOC. REV. 121, 133–34 (1996). 
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1. At Trial 
The default presumption at trial is that the defendant was sane at the 
time of the alleged crime.472F472 The initial burden of production is always on 
the defendant to rebut that presumption.473F473 “The burden that must be carried 
by a defendant who raises the insanity issue . . . defines the strength of the 
sanity presumption.”474F474 
Beyond uniformly placing the initial burden of production on the 
defendant, states vary widely in their evidentiary standards for (dis)proving 
insanity at trial.475F475 Some states are very permissive. In Massachusetts, for 
example, once a defendant provides any credible evidence of insanity, the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
sane at the time of the crime.476F476 At the other end of the spectrum, states may 
even (though none do today) reverse the burden and require the defendant to 
prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 477F477 Federal law and most states 
opt for a middle ground. They treat the insanity defense like any other 
affirmative defense, which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence or clear and convincing evidence.478F478 
By setting the burden too high, jurisdictions risk convicting defendants 
who are not criminally responsible. By setting it too low, they risk letting 
those who are criminally responsible go free. As a general rule, the American 
public seems more concerned with the latter. 479F479 In light of the general 
suspicion with which lay people regard corporations, the concern would 
 
 472 W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Presumption of Continuing Insanity as Applied to Accused 
in Criminal Case, 27 A.L.R.2d 121 § 11 (1953) (“The state, in a criminal prosecution, 
normally has the benefit of a presumption that all persons are sane and criminally responsible, 
so that, in most jurisdictions, the accused who contends that he is or was insane has the burden 
of proving his mental incompetence, or at least of introducing evidence to meet the 
presumption of sanity.”). 
 473 ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173(a). 
 474 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 769 (2006). 
 475 See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952). 
 476 Commonwealth v. Kostka, 350 N.E.2d 444, 451 (Mass. 1976). 
 477 In 1952, Oregon was the only state to require this. Leland, 343 U.S. at 798. Oregon has 
since changed its approach. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.410 (West, Westlaw through 2020 
Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.). 
 478 PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 113, § 3:15; 
see Clark, 548 U.S. at 769. 
 479 James W. Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity Defense: Proposals To Reform Post-
Acquittal Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 961, 963 (1986) (“[T]he popular 
dissatisfaction with other issues, such as allocation of the burden of proof on the insanity issue 
and the insanity standard, is fueled ultimately by concern over the possibility that too many 
defendants are ‘getting off,’ which to many in the general public means ‘going free.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
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likely be amplified for corporate defendants. The profit motive, both for 
corporate defendants and their highly compensated experts, could bias juries 
against the defense in ways not usually applicable for individual defendants. 
An additional worry is that skepticism about corporations improperly 
benefiting from the insanity defense could bleed into greater skepticism 
toward individual insanity. 
These considerations favor a stronger burden for corporate criminal 
defendants. For good reason, no state presently requires defendants to prove 
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt; doing so would effectively foreclose the 
defense. A demanding intermediary standard like clear and convincing 
evidence seems the best affirmative burden of proof for corporate defendants. 
2. Post-Trial Commitment 
If a defendant successfully claims insanity, the court must then 
determine what to do with him: release him or commit him to an institution 
for treatment and evaluation. The stakes at this stage are palpable. The 
defendant has successfully proven that he suffered from a mental disease or 
defect that led him to commit a criminal act. If he is still insane, releasing 
him could endanger the public and forfeit an opportunity to provide the 
defendant with needed treatment. The risks are even greater for corporate 
criminals. Because of corporations’ often far-reaching social and economic 
standing, the public is more vulnerable to corporate misconduct than 
individual misconduct. The law can mitigate these risks by tailoring the 
procedure courts use when deciding whether and how to commit corporate 
acquittees. 
Jurisdictions have different standards for committing insanity 
acquittees. Earlier in the defense’s history, commitment to a mental health 
institution was automatic.480F480 As Blackstone noted: “It was the doctrine of our 
ancient law that persons deprived of their reason might be confined till they 
recovered their senses, without waiting for the forms of a commission or 
other special authority from the crown . . . .”481F481 Today, some states still use 
automatic commitment for a period to allow the court to determine whether 
longer commitment is appropriate.482F482 Federal law is illustrative: “[A] 
person . . . found not guilty only by reason of insanity . . . shall be committed 
 
 480 Barbara A. Weiner, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Sane Approach, 56 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1057, 1064–66 (1980). 
 481 J.W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH’S BLACKSTONE 745 (1959). 
 482 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186) 
(“[“When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect of a 
felony . . . the court shall commit the person to the department of health services for a specified 
period . . . .”). 
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to a suitable facility . . . .”483F483 Within forty days, the court must then conduct 
a follow-up hearing.484F484 Some state jurisdictions require a showing of 
continuing danger prior to any commitment. 485F485 Whether for temporary or 
longer-term commitment, the inquiry is typically into whether the acquittee 
poses a “substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage 
of property of another due to a present mental disease or defect.” 486F486 
Jurisdictions differ as to the standard of proof they require for 
committing insanity acquittees. Some use the same higher standard generally 
used for civil commitment (clear and convincing evidence),487F487 others merely 
require a preponderance of the evidence. 488F488 Under federal law, the standard 
varies depending on the seriousness of the underlying crime. 489F489 Jurisdictions 
also differ as to who bears the proof (be it the defendant or the state).490F490 
The rationale behind automatically committing successful insanity 
claimants or for using lower thresholds of proof for commitment is 
straightforward. “The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates 
dangerousness.”491F491 This has been the American Psychiatric Association’s 
position regarding defendants acquitted by reason of insanity. 492F492 Moved by 
 
 483 18 U.S.C. § 4243(a). 
 484 18 U.S.C. § 4243(c). 
 485 ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173(g) n.91; 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON MENTAL HEALTH § 7–7.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 486 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d). 
 487 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46C.253(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 
Reg. Sess. of 86th Legis.) (“The hearing on disposition shall be conducted in the same manner 
as a hearing on an application for involuntary commitment under Subtitle C or D, Title 7, 
Health and Safety Code . . . .”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(3)(a) (requiring clear and 
convincing evidence). 
 488 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–2–314(e)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2020 First 
Extraordinary Sess. of the 92nd Ark. Gen. Assemb.) (requiring preponderance of the 
evidence). 
 489 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d). 
 490 Compare e.g., Milam v. State, 341 S.E.2d 216, 218 (Ga. 1986) (defendant), with People 
v. Murphy, 331 N.W.2d 152, 157 (Mich. 1982) (state). 
 491 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983) (footnote omitted); see also Alter v. 
Morris, 536 P.2d 630, 633 (Wash. 1975) (“[P]ast conduct is heavily indicative of the 
likelihood that a person will commit similar acts which will again endanger others.”). 
 492 Insanity Defense Work Group, supra note 467, at 686 (“Their future dangerousness 
need not be inferred; it may be assumed, at least for a reasonable period of time.”). But see 
Ellis, supra note 479, at 986 (“[T]he APA’s statement that future dangerousness can be 
‘assumed’ is thus unsupported, and indeed is contradicted by the existing studies. It simply is 
not true that all (or even most) acquittees will engage in dangerous conduct in the future.”); 
Morse, supra note 27, at 834 (“As I have shown, however, this presumption [of continuing 
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this common-sense supposition, “[c]ourts have justified lower standards of 
proof for commitment of insanity acquittees as an outgrowth of the normal 
purpose of civil commitment: protecting the community from the 
dangerously insane.”493F493 Some courts show little concern with making 
mistakes, i.e., committing someone who is, in fact, not insane, because, in 
their view, such a person should not have benefited from the insanity defense 
in the first place.494F494 Committing such acquittees, the thinking goes, deprives 
them of no liberty which they were otherwise due. Compulsory or 
presumptive commitment also raises the stakes of a successful insanity 
defense, thereby discouraging false pleas.495F495 
Ultimately, the decision about where to set the evidentiary standard for 
commitment should turn on weighing the relative costs of false positives 
(improperly committing an acquittee) and false negatives (improperly 
releasing an acquittee). For individuals, this is a fraught balance to strike. 
False negatives risk unnecessary danger to the public (and possibly to the 
acquittee himself). False positives risk committing an acquittee who actually 
is not a danger to himself or to others. This could happen, for example, if the 
defendant was only temporarily insane at the time of the crime but is no 
longer insane at the time of acquittal. 496F496 As such, false positives infringe on 
 
insanity and dangerousness] is not justified. At most, the state should be entitled to brief 
custody after an insanity acquittal during which the acquittee can be evaluated for a 
commitment hearing to assess present disorder and consequent dangerousness.”); Bernard L. 
Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 447–48 
(1974). 
 493 Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, supra note 420, at 606–07 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 494 Warren v. Harvey, 632 F.2d 925, 931 (2d Cir. 1980) (“While the acquittee therefore 
may be deprived erroneously of his liberty in the commitment process, the liberty he loses is 
likely to be liberty which society mistakenly had permitted him to retain in the criminal 
process.”) (emphasis added). 
 495 Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962) (“[] Congress might have considered 
it appropriate to provide compulsory commitment for those who successfully invoke an 
insanity defense in order to discourage false pleas of insanity.”). 
 496 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615, supra note 80, § 10 (“Temporary insanity may 
constitute a sufficient defense to a criminal charge. Thus, if a defendant was insane at the time 
of a particular offense, he may be found not guilty by reason of insanity regardless of whether 
the period of insanity lasted several months or several hours.”) (footnote omitted); see also 
People v. Kelly, 516 P.2d 875, 883 (Cal. 1973) (en banc); Commitment Following an Insanity 
Acquittal, supra note 420, at 620 (identifying “several possible groups of insanity acquittees 
who are neither criminally responsible for the act with which they were charged, nor insane 
and dangerous enough to be criminally committed”); In re Franklin, 496 P.2d 465, 472 (Cal. 
1972) (en banc). 
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individuals’ weighty due process interests against unjustified infringement of 
their liberty.497F497 
Like people, corporations can experience temporary insanity. For 
example, a corporation with an otherwise stellar compliance program may 
have committed a crime through a subversive rogue employee and promptly 
fired him. In such a case, the corporation might qualify as legally insane 
under the volitional test even though, after firing the rogue, it no longer has 
a volitional deficit.498F498 A treatment regimen could accomplish nothing since, 
by hypothesis, the corporation already has effective compliance in place. 
Despite the possibility of temporary corporate insanity, false positives 
regarding commitment carry greater risks and false negatives less weighty 
infringements. As mentioned, the public is much more vulnerable to 
corporate crime than to individual crime.499F499 Releasing a dangerous corporate 
acquittee with no constraints or oversights can endanger many more people 
than a typical dangerous individual. In contrast, corporations do not have the 
same liberty interests at stake with false positives. As discussed above, 
corporations cannot be physically incapacitated. Corporations that are being 
treated will generally continue to operate; their employees will still show up 
to work, their creditors will still receive payments, and their customers will 
still receive goods and services. During that time, however, a planned 
program of compliance reform would be in progress. 
The cost-benefit ledger for corporate acquittees favors automatic 
commitment. With respect to individuals, most jurisdictions require some 
showing that the insanity which afflicted the defendant at the time of the 
crime is continuing or permanent.500F500 That showing should not be required 
for corporate acquittees. This effectively sets up an unrebuttable 
presumption, at least until commitment, that corporate acquittees continue to 
 
 497 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428–29 (1979). 
 498 Temporary corporate insanity is less likely for corporations that qualify under the 
cognitive test. The sorts of mechanisms, e.g., corporate culture, that underlie cognitive deficits 
in corporations are generally more durable. 
 499 The FBI estimates that the economic costs of white-collar crime are twenty times the 
economic costs of all other crime combined. Compare RODNEY HUFF, CHRISTIAN DESILETS & 
JOHN KANE, THE 2010 NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME 21 (2010) (“[The] 
approximate the annual cost of white collar crime [is] between $300 and $660 billion.”), with 
Kathryn E. McCollister, Michael T. French & Hai Fang, The Cost of Crime to Society: New 
Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG & ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 98, 98–99 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2835847/ 
[https://perma.cc/4H2A-DQZ2] (“[M]ore than 23 million criminal offenses were committed 
in 2007, resulting in approximately $15 billion in economic losses to the victims . . . .”). 
 500 Shipley, supra note 472, § 2 (“[I]t appears to be well established in most jurisdictions 
that in order to give rise to such a presumption the evidence must disclose prior insanity which 
was permanent or continuing in nature.”) (footnote omitted). 
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be insane and to pose a public danger. The drafters of the federal insanity 
defense took this stance toward individuals: “[I]nsanity, once established, 
should be presumed to continue and the accused should automatically be 
confined for treatment until it can be shown that he has recovered.” 501F501 The 
Supreme Court has held that such a presumption does not violate due process: 
“When a person . . . is found not guilty by reason of insanity . . . [it may be] 
properly inferred that at the time of the verdict the defendant [i]s still 
mentally ill and dangerous and hence c[an] be committed.” 502F502 Regardless of 
the merits of this federal position toward individual acquittees, it should be 
universally adopted for corporate acquittees. Given the significant risks of 
failing to reform a dangerous corporation, any corporate criminal defendant 
that benefits from the insanity defense should be presumed insane and then 
required to submit to a searching expert evaluation of continuing 
dangerousness. 
3. Release 
Once an insanity acquittee has been committed for treatment, there must 
be a process to determine when he has completed his treatment and should 
be released. The standards and process for release determine how long an 
acquittee remains in state custody. They also determine what safety threshold 
an acquittee’s condition must reach before releasing him to the public. 
As the Supreme Court has held, an “acquittee may be held as long as he 
is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer.”503F503 Individual jurisdictions 
have wide latitude to determine the timing of review, who has the power to 
initiate review, the precise standard applicable, and who has the burden of 
proving it.504F504 The defendant or an official in the mental institution to which 
the defendant is committed typically initiates the release process. 505F505 In most 
 
 501 S. REP. NO. 84-1170, at 13 (1955). 
 502 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 76 (1992); see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 
366 (1983) (“We therefore conclude that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is a 
sufficient foundation for commitment of an insanity acquittee for the purposes of treatment 
and the protection of society.”). But see Robert C. Hunt & E. David Wiley, Operation 
Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCH. 974, 978 (1968) (finding that insanity acquittees 
are not significantly more dangerous); Henry J. Steadman, Follow-Up on Baxstrom Patients 
Returned to Hospitals for the Criminally Insane, 130 AM. J. PSYCH. 317, 317 (1973) 
(discussing the very small percentage of people who return to hospitals for the criminally 
insane). 
 503 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77. 
 504 See Gretchen E. Rowan, Foucha v. Louisiana: Confinement Based on Dangerousness 
Alone, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 736–743, 737 n.47 (1993). 
 505 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 322 
(1972). 
2021] THE CORPORATE INSANITY DEFENSE 81 
jurisdictions, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion to show it is no 
longer necessary to confine him. 506F506 Jurisdictions use different standards of 
proof, from a preponderance of the evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt.507F507 
A range of more restrictive or lenient procedures are available. Federal 
law illustrates an intermediate approach. An acquittee’s mental health 
director initiates release by certifying that the acquittee has recovered from 
his disease and no longer poses a substantial risk to person or property. 508F508 
Release becomes official if a court subsequently agrees with the certification 
under a clear and convincing standard.509F509 Texas has a more acquittee-
friendly process. That state mandates annual court review. 510F510 Commitment 
continues only if a physician demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence 
that continued commitment is “appropriate.” 511F511 Arizona has gone in the 
opposite direction, placing the burden of proof on the acquittee and charging 
a psychiatric security review board with making release decisions.512F512 
Once again, applying demanding but not prohibitively high standards 
and burdens to corporate acquittees would be preferable. As to the length of 
treatment, the law estimates that one to five years are needed to rehabilitate 
corporations with defective compliance programs. Sentencing courts 
ordering compliance-oriented probation are capped at a term of five years. 513F513 
The pretrial diversion agreements that prosecutors design to improve 
compliance programs in corporations suspected of misconduct also typically 
range from one to five years. 514F514 Probation and pretrial diversion agreements 
build in some flexibility by extending the termination date if the corporation 
fails to cooperate. 515F515 
Unlike probation or pretrial diversion, fixed terms of treatment would 
likely be a mistake where the corporate insanity defense is concerned. The 
law should strive to avoid any impression that it accords corporations 
 
 506 Id. at 324–25. 
 507 Id. 
 508 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f). 
 509 Id. 
 510 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46C.261(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. 
of the 86th Leg.). 
 511 Id. (h). 
 512 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3994(C), (D), (F) (West, Westlaw through Second Reg. Sess. 
of the 54th Leg.). 
 513 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 514 Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 450, at 1723. 
 515 See id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8F1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018) (“Upon a finding of a violation of a condition of probation, the court may extend the 
term of probation, impose more restrictive conditions of probation, or revoke probation and 
resentence the organization.”). 
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preferential treatment. As for individuals, the term should be tied to treatment 
success.516F516 The length of time needed for treatment is difficult to predict in 
advance.517F517 The goal, after all, is to protect the public and rehabilitate the 
corporation, not to impose punitive or lenient conditions. 
Decisions about release should apply demanding standards and involve 
multiple parties. Once again, it would be appropriate to place the burden of 
production on the corporation to show that it no longer presents a danger to 
person or property. The burden of persuasion should strike a balance between 
the need to protect the public and the need to preserve the corporation as a 
going concern. A clear-and-convincing-evidence standard rather than a 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt or a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
would be appropriate. 
As to the identity of those with the power to initiate review and decide 
on release, federal law for individuals provides a good model. The expert 
designated to oversee and implement the corporation’s rehabilitation could 
initiate the process by certifying that the corporation now has an effective 
compliance program in place targeted to the violation of which it was 
acquitted. A judge should then make the release determination. This will 
provide some check on the possibility of industry capture, a concern that has 
arisen in the pretrial diversion context. In all cases, release should be 
conditional on appropriate terms,518F518 such as the corporation maintaining its 
compliance program and submitting to future compliance audits. 519F519 
Treatment should resume if the corporation violates one of the conditions. 520F520 
 
 516 Morse, supra note 27, at 827 (“A fixed hospital term, tied to the length of the prison 
sentence allowed for the crime charged, is also improper for the same reason: hospital 
commitment should be related to continuing disorder, not to irrelevant punishment concerns. 
In large measure the terms of sentences are defined by the punishment the offender 
deserves.”). 
 517 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (“[I]t is impossible to predict how 
long it will take for any given individual to recover—or indeed whether he ever will 
recover . . . .”). 
 518 Weihofen, supra note 420, at 867 (“Just as it is recognized today that parole should be 
the normal method of release from prison, so conditional release under supervision should 
become the normal method of release for this group of criminal insane.”). 
 519 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f)(2) (“[Where appropriate, a court may] (A) order that [an insanity 
acquittee] be conditionally discharged under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or 
psychological care or treatment that has been prepared for him . . . and (B) order, as an explicit 
condition of release, that he comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or 
psychological care or treatment.”). 
 520 Id. § 4243(g) (stating that if an acquittee violated a condition of release, “[he] may be 
arrested” and the court will determine, following a hearing, whether “[he] should be remanded 
to a suitable facility”). 
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VI. VINDICATING VICTIMS 
The corporate insanity defense—and the rehabilitative treatment it 
portends for corporate acquittees—is the best way to vindicate the interests 
of victims injured by insane corporations. There are three primary types of 
interests victims have in the criminal process: justice, expressive, and 
preventive. To see how the corporate insanity defense vindicates these 
interests, one must set aside many assumptions drawn from the general part 
of criminal law because corporate criminal law works very different. 
A. JUSTICE INTERESTS 
Generally, in criminal law, victims’ justice interests include being made 
whole and seeing the defendant suffer.521F521 The emphasis in corporate criminal 
law is exclusively on the former. Corporations do not suffer. 522F522 The best the 
law can do is to show it is being tough on crime and the defendant. As 
explained above, the insanity defense does not conflict with that interest. A 
successful insanity defense is the law’s way of recognizing that a defendant 
is not fully responsible for his actions. If a defendant is not fully responsible, 
the justice interest in seeing him suffer is correspondingly weaker. In any 
case, insanity acquittees often face just as harsh—or even harsher—treatment 
than they would have if the defense had not been available. This fact would 
be no different for corporate acquittees. 
As to victims’ financial interests, it bears repeating that corporate 
acquittees should, and would, still be obliged to make their victims whole. A 
successful insanity defense does not mean there has been no injury. Often, 
victims or regulators will be able to bring a civil suit for damages. 523F523 Insanity 
is no defense outside criminal law.524F524 Examples abound of private parties 
successfully suing insane defendants,525F525 sometimes even after the defendant 
 
 521 Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime 
Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 159 (1996). 
 522 Diamantis, supra note 253, at 879; Dynamic Image Techs. v. United States, 221 F.3d 
34, 37 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[C]orporations, unlike natural persons, have no emotions . . . .”). 
 523 Delahanty v. Hinckley, 799 F.Supp. 184, 186 (D.D.C. 1992) (“[Though not criminally 
liable,] [an] insane person is liable for compensatory damages for his torts where express 
malice or evil intent is not a necessary element of the tort.”) (citation omitted). 
 524 See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 130 
(2d ed. 2020); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 (AM. L. INST. 2010); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (AM. L. INST. 1965). But see Breunig v. Am. Family Ins., 173 
N.W.2d 619, 627 (Wis. 1970) (upholding defense to civil suit for sudden onset of insanity). 
 525 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill. 1887) (shooting; “It is well settled 
that, though a lunatic is not punishable criminally, he is liable in a civil action for any tort he 
may commit.”); Jewell v. Colby, 24 A. 902, 902 (N.H. 1890) (“On the facts stated in the case, 
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mounted a successful insanity defense in a criminal trial for the same 
underlying misconduct.526F526 Connecticut, the lone jurisdiction with some 
contrary authority (at least, the only one I could find), 527F527 has since changed 
its approach.528F528 
Criminal courts faced with an insane corporate defendant might be able 
to speed victim recovery using the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act 
(“MVRA”). The Act makes restitution for the full amount of victim losses 
mandatory in certain instances, notwithstanding any other provision of 
federal law, and even where the defendant cannot pay. 529F529 Since criminal 
punishment is prohibited for insanity acquittees, the applicability of the 
MVRA turns on whether restitution counts as punishment. Some states, in 
applying their own version of the MVRA, have found that restitution is 
punitive.530F530 Federal circuits seem to be of the opposite view.531F531 The Supreme 
Court has given mixed signals. 532F532 Other scholars and I have argued that 
restitution is not punitive since its purpose is to make victims whole rather 
 
evidence of the defendant’s insanity is not admissible to defeat the right to 
recover . . . .”); Bollinger v. Rader, 69 S.E. 497, 497 (N.C. 1910) (killing); Seals v. Snow, 254 
P. 348, 349 (Kan. 1927) (killing); Ross v. York, 233 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) 
(shooting); Shapiro v. Tchernowitz, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (wrongful 
death); Bolen v. Howard, 452 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Ky. 1970) (shooting). 
 526 See, e.g., Parke v. Dennard, 118 So. 396, 399 (Ala. 1928); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Porter, 181 F. Supp. 81, 88 (D.D.C. 1960); Vosnos v. Perry, 357 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1976); Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 472–73 (Conn. 1988). 
 527 Fitzgerald v. Lawhorn, 294 A.2d 338 (Conn. 1972). 
 528 Polmatier, 537 A.2d at 468. 
 529 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1), 3664(f)(1)(A). 
 530 See, e.g., State v. Garnett, 916 A.2d 393, 396–98 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007); State v. 
Thomas, 69 P.3d 814, 814–15 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (per curiam). 
 531 See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing that 
“the [statute’s] intended beneficiaries are the victims, not the victimizers” and that “[t]he 
criminal has no rights under the quoted provision”); Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act – Constitutional Issues, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 239, §§ 8, 10, 11, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28 (2007) (noting Sixth and Eighth Amendments inapplicable to 
restitution). 
 532 Compare Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 365 (2005) (holding that the 
purpose of restitution is to “mete out appropriate criminal punishment”), with Hughey v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990) (holding that the purpose of restitution is to 
“compensate victims”); see also Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 612–13 (2010) (“[The 
MVRA] seeks . . . primarily to ensure that victims of a crime receive full restitution . . . and 
only secondarily to help the defendant.”); Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 
100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 98 (2014) (“[W]hen restitution is imposed as a part of sentencing in a 
criminal case, the restitution is punishment.”). 
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than to inconvenience the defendant.533F533 Corporate acquittees should be 
required to pay victim restitution, regardless of the stance jurisdictions take 
toward individual acquittees. 
B. EXPRESSIVE INTERESTS 
Victims’ expressive interests in criminal law include having an 
opportunity to tell their story at trial 534F534 and having public condemnation of 
the wrong that was done to them.535F535 The impact the insanity defense has on 
those interests depends on the baseline for comparison. For individual 
criminal defendants, the baseline is an alternative where, at the end of trial, 
insane defendants are convicted rather than acquitted. Since the trial still 
occurs and victims still have the opportunity to serve as witnesses, the effect 
of the insanity defense on their interest in telling their story is a wash. Since 
insane individual defendants are not convicted, victims’ interest in the public 
condemnation is arguably diminished by the defense. 
The comparative baseline for corporate offenders is very different. 
Corporate prosecutions and convictions are rare events.536F536 Investigations into 
the most significant corporate wrongdoing, affecting the greatest number of 
victims, routinely ends in pretrial diversion. 537F537 These deals, cut by 
prosecutors and corporate suspects in secret negotiations, avoid corporate 
trial and conviction in exchange for concessions by the corporation (usually 
in the form of fines and compliance reform). 538F538 The corporate parties agree 
to a statement of facts, but typically will not admit guilt.539F539 Everything is “off 
the books” since courts have no oversight and the facts are never entered into 
 
 533 See Diamantis, supra note 43, at 534–35; Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New 
Paradigm for Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279, 300 (1977) (arguing that restitution should be 
purely compensatory in nature and therefore should be imposed according to the nature and 
consequences of the crime, even on criminal defendants who are not criminally responsible 
by reason of insanity). 
 534 See The Trauma of Victimization, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
https://members.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-
victims/trauma-of-victimization [https://perma.cc/U8LJ-K8DB] (last visited Oct. 17, 2020). 
 535 David Alm, Crime Victims and the Right to Punishment, 13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 63, 69 
(2019). 
 536 Diamantis & Laufer, supra note 71, at 454. 
 537 GARRETT, supra note 217, at 162. 
 538 Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 159–60 (2008). 
 539 Buell, supra note 437, at 89 (“Notice that there is nothing traditionally criminal in this 
arrangement—no guilty plea or jury verdict, no sentencing, no punishment other than a fine.”). 
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the public record.540F540 Many feel that these agreements let corporations off too 
leniently and procure very little by way of actual change or sanction. 541F541 
Prosecutorial oversight and follow-through on the terms of the agreements 
are also often lacking.542F542 Judges who attempt to exercise any real oversight 
find their hands tied by the separation of powers concerns—pretrial diversion 
agreements are the exclusive prerogative of the executive.543F543 
The corporate insanity defense holds out the prospect of having more 
criminal trials of corporations that would presently receive pretrial diversion 
agreements. One major barrier to trying corporations is that, in many 
sectors,544F544 convicted corporations lose essential business privileges, like 
environmental permits,545F545 the authority to audit publicly traded 
companies,546F546 or the right to submit receipts to Medicare and Medicaid. 547F547 
These collateral consequences are life-ending.548F548 DOJ guidelines instruct 
prosecutors to bear these collateral consequences in mind when deciding 
whether to charge corporations.549F549 The usual result is pretrial diversion. The 
corporate insanity defense alters the calculus by sometimes giving 
prosecutors a means of bringing corporations to trial while avoiding 
conviction and its collateral effects. 
More corporate criminal trials would mean satisfying more of victims’ 
expressive interests, even for trials that end with a successful insanity 
defense. Typically, a defendant raises the insanity defense only after the facts 
pertaining to guilt are clear.550F550 “A plea of not guilty by reason of 
 
 540 United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 736–38 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Lisa Kern 
Griffin, Inside-Out Enforcement, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 67, at 110 
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government’s enforcement strategy and the accountability of prosecutors.”). 
 541 GARRETT, supra note 217, at 63 (“Corporations plead guilty, and a plea agreement can 
include similar terms . . . . A deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement is even more 
lenient, though, because it . . . avoids both an indictment and a criminal conviction.”). 
 542 Id. at 75 (“These data suggest that prosecutors are not taking structural reform seriously.”). 
 543 Fokker, 818 F.3d at 736–38. 
 544 Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial 
Discretion to Impose Structural Reform, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 67, 
at 65. 
 545 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (Clean Water Act). 
 546 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b); 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(2). 
 547 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a). 
 548 Rachel Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN THE 
BOARDROOM, supra note 67, at 179. 
 549 Thompson Memo, supra note 209, at 3. 
 550 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615, supra note 80, § 19 (“When a defendant seeks to 
raise the defense of insanity, the court must decide whether there should be a unitary trial, in 
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insanity . . . does not implicate guilt or innocence but, instead, determines 
whether the accused shall be punished for the guilt which has already been 
established.”551F551 During the guilt phase of a corporate trial, victims will have 
an opportunity to tell their narratives and memorialize their experiences of 
corporate wrongdoing in an official, public setting. 
Resolving corporate wrongdoing with an insanity defense can also 
satisfy victims’ expressive interests in public condemnation better than 
pretrial diversion. Pretrial diversion cuts any note of condemnation out of the 
process. The resolution is contractual rather than criminal. When 
corporations raise a successful insanity defense at trial, the verdict is one of 
acquittal, but acquittal with expressive bite. An acquittal by reason of insanity 
is importantly different from a finding of innocence or an acquittal premised 
on other defenses. Jurisdictions vary in exactly how they phrase the verdict. 
Federal law is representative: “[T]he court shall find the defendant—(1) 
guilty; (2) not guilty; or (3) not guilty only by reason of insanity.” 552F552 The 
latter option recognizes that victims were wronged even as it ultimately 
precludes criminal punishment of the defendant. Many states have gone a 
step further, allowing verdicts of “guilty but insane.” 553F553 As one commentator 
remarked, this effectively “mean[s] ‘guilty,’” even if it is not formally a 
conviction.554F554 
C. PREVENTIVE INTERESTS 
Victims have a deep interest in preventing criminal wrongdoing from 
recurring. The interest extends to their own future integrity and also to other 
possible future victims. By doing what it can to prevent criminals from 
 
which evidence as to both guilt and insanity are presented during the same trial, or a bifurcated 
trial. In a bifurcated trial, the first phase focuses exclusively on whether the defendant 
committed the charged crime. The second phase focuses solely on the question of insanity. 
The second stage is not reached unless and until the prosecution proves in the first phase 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a criminal act . . . . Bifurcation is 
often preferred on the basis that a unitary trial is fraught with confusion.”). 
 551 People v. Blakely, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876, 878 (2014) (internal quotation marks and 
emphasis omitted). 
 552 18 U.S.C. § 4242(b). Federal law thirty-five years ago was different. Shannon v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 573, 575 (1994) (“Prior to the enactment of the Insanity Defense 
Reform Act of 1984 . . . [d]efendants who mounted a successful insanity defense—that is, 
those who raised a reasonable doubt as to their sanity at the time of the offense—were simply 
found ‘not guilty.’”). 
 553 Diane Courselle, Mark Watt & Donna Sheen, Suspects, Defendants, and Offenders 
with Mental Retardation in Wyoming, 1 WYO. L. REV. 1, 54–55 n.268 (2001). 
 554 Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A 
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
13 n.68 (2003). 
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recidivating, the law shows victims that it takes the harm done to them 
seriously. 
The preventive aspects of the insanity defense are often overlooked in 
defendant-focused discussions. By removing a dangerously insane acquittee 
from the general population, the law protects his victims, past and future, 
from injury. Yet it is not enough simply to remove the acquittee; it is 
important that the insanity defense ordinarily operates to place the acquittee 
in a treatment facility. Simply imprisoning the acquittee would only relocate 
the risks he poses from the general population to the prison population. 555F555 
Prisons are ill-equipped to handle insane inmates or to prevent their harmful 
interactions with prison officials and other inmates. 556F556 Treatment facilities 
serve two preventive purposes. First, because of their expertise relative to 
prisons, they are better suited to address the risks that acquittees pose during 
confinement. Second, because most of those who commit crimes will 
eventually be released, treatment reduces the risks that acquittees pose after 
confinement. Returning a dangerously insane person back to public life 
would expose his past and future victims to significant risk. While prison life 
often exacerbates mental health issues, 557F557 insanity acquittees who are 
released after hospitalization have lower rearrest rates than “sane” defendants 
convicted of committing the same crimes.558F558 
Similar reasoning would apply to criminal corporations acquitted under 
the insanity defense. I have argued extensively elsewhere that the only way 
to effectively prevent corporate criminal recidivism is through forcible 
rehabilitation.559F559 The arguments apply with even greater force to 
corporations whose dysfunction justifies their use of the insanity defense. In 
brief, the two approaches the law currently uses—threatening corporate fines 
 
 555 JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 58 (1975). 
 556 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS 
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf 
(describing the prison environment—being intended for punishment—as conflicting with 
insane inmates’ mental health needs). 
 557 See, e.g., id. at 94–105, 153–54 (noting examples of inmates’ worsening mental health 
due to understaffing, lack of timely resources, and inadequate monitoring and citing prison 
segregation as a key reason for inmates’ deteriorating mental condition). 
 558 Weihofen, supra note 420, at 868–69 (“Meaningful statistics are difficult to obtain, but 
such as exist indicate that persons acquitted of crime by reason of insanity and subsequently 
discharged from the hospital as recovered are not more likely to commit further crimes than 
are persons with similar prior criminal records who have never been in a mental hospital . . . . 
If anything, the rate of subsequent arrest among ex-mental patients with a record of criminal 
arrest prior to hospitalization seems to be lower than rearrest rates in persons with similar 
records who had not been in a mental hospital.”). 
 559 See generally Diamantis, supra note 43 (arguing that fining corporations does not 
promote reform or deterrence). 
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and prosecutor-led reform—do not work. Empirical studies demonstrate that 
increasing corporate fines does not increase corporate deterrence.560F560 The 
basic economic reason is simple: agency costs.561F561 A corporate fine, paid by 
the corporation, does not directly impact the incentives of the individuals 
within a corporation who are in a position to commit or avoid crime. 562F562 
Prosecution-led reform through pretrial diversion fails in part because of 
what some scholars call the “compliance game”: The DOJ seems more 
interested in scoring political points and clearing cases than ensuring 
meaningful solutions to corporate crime.563F563 Even well-intentioned 
prosecutors lack the expertise and institutional competence to design, 
implement, or oversee effective corporate reform. 564F564 Where a corporate 
criminal exhibits the sort of dysfunction that could justify an insanity 
defense, corporate fines and prosecutors are particularly inept. The selfsame 
dysfunction can hinder the rational cost-benefit mechanisms by which fines 
have their intended preventive effects. Such corporations are also in even 
greater need of the expert guidance that prosecutors cannot provide. 
Effective prevention would require court oversight and injecting more 
expertise into the process. The corporate insanity defense promises both. 
Court oversight could be a solution to the compliance game by bringing some 
objectivity to the resolution of corporate cases. 565F565 As discussed above, the 
corporate insanity defense lowers some of the barriers prosecutors face in 
taking criminal corporations to trial. Trials bring courts onto the scene, and 
court involvement would continue post-acquittal through supervision of 
reform. Since the treatment would be designed, overseen, and implemented 
 
 560 See e.g., Alexander & Cohen, supra note 67, at 24 (“There is little evidence that 
increasing the magnitude of monetary sanctions has a deterrent effect.”); GARRETT, supra note 
217, at 165–68 (noting that corporations who have already paid millions of dollars in DPAs 
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 561 Alexander & Cohen, supra note 67, at 2. 
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context of their limited deterrence, as “meaningless retribution”); see also S.E.C. v. Bank of 
America Corp., 653 F.Supp.2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he fine is imposed, not on the 
individuals putatively responsible, but on the shareholders, it is worse than pointless: it further 
victimizes the victims.”). 
 563 Laufer, supra note 434, at 79–80; see also Reilly, supra note 5, at 344–46 (“The 
question is do we really want our federal prosecutors to focus on reforming corporate culture 
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 564 Arlen, supra note 544, at 66–68. 
 565 Mihailis E. Diamantis, Looking Glass: A Reply to Caulfield and Laufer, 103 IOWA L. 
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by compliance experts, it would be better suited to securing the crime-free 
future that victims deserve. 
CONCLUSION: WILL CORPORATIONS GO FOR IT? 
All serious corporate crime provokes our instinctive ire. As in the 
general part of criminal law, enlightened policy does not always favor 
submitting to the lure of instinct. When a defendant lacks sufficient self-
control or the capacity to distinguish right from wrong, all of the basic goals 
of criminal justice call for an alternative to punishment. Sanction cannot 
deliver desert where none is called for. The threat of sanction cannot deter 
where control and cognition are compromised. This is just as true of 
volitionally- and cognitively impaired corporate defendants as it is of 
individual defendants. The insanity defense offers a needed alternative. 
Fairness to defendants is the primary motivation for the insanity defense 
in the individual context; in the corporate context, it is respect for victims. 
Corporations who successfully raise the insanity defense would immediately 
be neutralized as public threats through necessary constraints on their 
business conduct. While those constraints are in place, corporate acquittees 
would face an intensive treatment program, designed and implemented by 
government experts. The constraints would only be released once the experts 
certify, and a court determines, that the corporation no longer poses a danger. 
Victims can rest assured that they and others will not face injury again. At 
the same time, other innocent corporate stakeholders benefit as the 
corporations on whom their livelihood rests would remain ongoing concerns. 
While an initial concern about the corporate insanity defense could be 
that it would prove too much of a boon for corporations, the opposite concern 
now arises: Will corporations find the defense attractive enough raise it? The 
benefits of the defense only materialize if corporations can see an overall 
advantage in it. If acquitted, corporations can avoid the reputational costs of 
conviction, but being declared “criminally insane” would hardly make for an 
easy public relations challenge. As one managerial psychologist wrote: 
“Viewed from the necessarily pragmatic viewpoint of the practicing 
consultant and corporate client, are there many CEOs out there who want to 
be told that ‘I diagnosed your organization and I am sorry to inform you that 
the entire system suffers from narcissistic personality disorder or borderline 
personality disorder?’”566F566 Adding insult to injury, executives and managers 
seem to be particularly averse to the sort of oversight and rehabilitative 
corporate treatment that the insanity defense would necessarily entail. 
 
 566 Goldman, supra note 306, at 407. 
2021] THE CORPORATE INSANITY DEFENSE 91 
Compulsory reform can be expensive, and it infringes the autonomy interests 
that managers’ guard so closely.567F567 
Despite these costs, there are three compelling advantages that the 
insanity defense offers corporations. First, as compared to conviction, 
acquittal under the insanity defense would avoid the fatal collateral 
consequences that can follow a guilty verdict. Many convicted corporations 
automatically face various restrictions—like debarment or loss of license—
that effectively terminate their ability to ply their trade.568F568 Any resolution 
that avoids that result should be preferable from the corporation’s 
perspective. 
Second, there is reason for corporations to prefer reform following an 
insanity defense over reform pursuant to a pretrial diversion agreement. If 
acquitted at trial under the insanity defense, corporations could avoid paying 
the criminal fines that are a near ubiquitous feature of pretrial diversion 
agreements.569F569 Additionally, corporations may see some benefit to having 
courts involved in their rehabilitation. Pretrial diversion agreements 
commonly reserve to the DOJ exclusive and total discretion to determine 
whether the corporation has complied. 570F570 This despotic dynamic raises 
obvious concerns for corporations. 571F571 Judicial oversight following a 
successful insanity plea should result in a more objective and balanced 
process. 
The third and final appeal of the corporate insanity defense for 
corporations is that, if all goes as it should, corporate acquittees emerge with 
an expert certification and court validation that they are now reliable business 
partners, service providers, employers, and community members. In short, 
 
 567 William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone, 20 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 392, 
392 (2018); see Fisse, supra note 227, at 1155 (“A recent discussion of the potential use of 
probation as a sanction against corporations pointed out that probationary orders requiring 
corporations to rectify defective standard operating procedures or to make other structural 
changes within the organization may have a significant deterrent as well as rehabilitative effect 
because such intervention detracts from managerial autonomy.”) (footnote omitted). 
 568 Baer, supra note 430, at 956 (“Although corporate entities are technically criminally 
liable for nearly all of their employees’ misconduct, the government has learned not to 
formally prosecute these entities due to the steep collateral consequences of indictment.”). 
 569 See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 450, at 1723–24. 
 570 Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of 
Corporations” Charging Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means 
for the Purposes of the Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 61–62 (2014); 
Andrew Chinsky, Essay, Modern Approaches to Financial Crime: Judge Rakoff, The 
Financial Crisis, DPAs, and Too Big to Prosecute, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 12, 28 (2014). 
 571 Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution 
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1437 (2007) (discussing “[t]he abusive tendencies of [the 
DPA and NPA] bargaining imbalance”). 
92 DIAMANTIS [Vol. 111 
they reenter public life with a credible claim to having become good 
corporate citizens. This credential should significantly mitigate the 
reputational effects of a criminal trial. A corporation that has successfully 
undergone treatment for the root cause of its criminal behavior is a 
corporation that is unlikely to reoffend. That is a result that everyone 
involved in the criminal justice process—the corporate defendant, its victims, 
the judge, the prosecutor, and the public—can applaud. 
 
